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Abstract
Expansion of the availability of judicial review of agency actions has had a marked effect
on the nature of trade proceedings, particularly in the antidumping and countervailing duty areas.
Since the emergence of the Court of International Trade (CIT) and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC or Federal Circuit), a number of major substantive decisions involving the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, as well as a few other import relief laws, have been
issued. The following discussion highlights CIT and CAFC accomplishments in these areas.
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INTRODUCTION
Expansion of the availability of judicial review of agency
actions has had a marked effect on the nature of trade proceed-
ings, particularly in the antidumping and countervailing duty
areas. While the agencies charged with administering these
import competition laws are still cloaked with broad discre-
tionary power, the availability of judicial review and the grow-
ing expertise of the courts have done much to keep the agen-
cies in check. The courts ensure that the factual data upon
which agency determinations are based is complete and accu-
rate, that proper procedures are utilized in the conduct of ad-
ministrative investigations and review proceedings, and that
statutory mandates are followed.
Since the emergence of the Court of International Trade
(CIT) and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC
or Federal Circuit),' a number of major substantive decisions
involving the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, as
well as a few other import relief laws, have been issued. The
following discussion highlights CIT and CAFC accomplish-
ments in these areas.
I. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
PROCEEDINGS
A. Initiation of an Administrative Proceeding
One example in which the CIT acted to keep an adminis-
trative agency in check is Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 2
which involved review of the Commerce Department's (Com-
1. The Court of International Trade (formerly the Customs Court) was created
by virtue of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat.1727. The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (formerly the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals) was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
2. 4 CIT 33, 544 F. Supp. 901 (1982).
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merce) decision not to commence a number of countervailing
duty investigations and an antidumping investigation regard-
ing certain steel products imported from ten foreign nations
and the European Economic Community (EEC). Commerce
dismissed the countervailing duty petition respecting some of
the steel products and countries on the ground that, in recent
years, there had been either no or de minimis importations of
those products.3 Commerce also declined to initiate a separate
investigation of the allegations relating to the EEC and, in-
stead, limited each investigation it did initiate to products from
a single nation. When the nation was a member of the EEC,
Commerce investigated both the national and EEC subsidies
with respect to products of that nation.4
The CIT rejected Commerce's approach, noting that the
agency's refusal to treat the EEC as a separate country and to
make its allegedly subsidized merchandise the subject of sepa-
rate investigations would leave "the ITC with the understanda-
ble impression that the ITC could only measure injury on the
basis of the subsidized production from each country sepa-
rately ... [which] may tend to narrow the ITC's mandate" by
precluding a unified consideration of injury.5 The court also
found that Commerce did not have unbridled discretion to de-
termine whether the EEC was "a country" for the purpose of
the countervailing duty law, citing to the statute6 and the legis-
lative history as evidencing an intention that customs unions,
like the EEC, are subject to the countervailing duty law in all
respects.7
The court also held that in evaluating the sufficiency of
petitions, Commerce may not use a de minimis standard to de-
termine whether the level of importations warrants initiation of
an investigation. The CIT held that use of such a standard un-
duly "usurped the role of the ITC whose duty it is to gauge
whether the levels of importation have any meaningful ef-
fect."'8 Accordingly, the court found that the petitions con-
tained sufficient allegations and information to warrant initia-
3. 4 CIT at 34, 544 F. Supp. at 903.
4. 4 CIT at 34-35, 544 F. Supp. at 903-04.
5. 4 CIT at 36, 544 F. Supp. at 904-05.
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(3) (1982).
7. 4 CIT at 37, 544 F. Supp. at 905.
8. 4 CIT at 39-40, 544 F. Supp. at 907.
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tion of investigations and ordered Commerce to commence in-
vestigations of all the products described in the petitions.
In United States v. Roses Inc.,' the CAFC determined that
during the 20-day period following the filing of an antidump-
ing petition Commerce can evaluate the facts alleged and as-
sess those facts in light of its own knowledge and expertise.
Commerce, however, may not receive additional information
from the respondent or the respondent's government in decid-
ing whether to initiate an investigation. Notwithstanding this
conclusion, the CAFC also determined that the CIT had erred
in ordering Commerce to commence an investigation. The
CAFC disapproved the CIT's independent determination that
the antidumping petition was sufficient to warrant an investiga-
tion, noting that "it must as a general rule be an abuse of au-
thority for a CITjudge to substitute his own opinion for that of
the agency and order an investigation on his own, instead of
remanding the case for agency determination according to cor-
rect procedures."'°
B. Best Information Available
The courts also have spoken on the question of an
agency's "duty to investigate" and to use the "best information
available" once an investigation has been commenced. Both
Commerce and the ITC are obligated to use the "best informa-
tion available" in reaching their respective determinations
under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws." The
cases indicate that the "best information available" standard
may not be satisfied by information that is supplied by the par-
ties in response to antidumping or countervailing duty ques-
tionnaires. For example, in Budd Co., Railway Division v. United
States,12 Judge Boe emphasized that the "best information
available" is not limited to that furnished by a petitioner or
party in interest to the proceedings. In the CIT's view, the
term "available" must be construed in accordance with its
common meaning, and the agency has an affirmative duty to
obtain all information that is accessible or may be obtained,
9. 706 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
10. Id. at 1569.
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(1982).
12. 1 CIT 67, 507 F. Supp. 997 (1980).
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whatever its source may be.'"
Similarly, in Krupp Stahl AG v. United States, t4 the court re-
fused to rule that Commerce must consider information pro-
vided by a party in response to an antidumping questionnaire
in reaching its preliminary determination. The information at
issue was not provided in sufficient time to allow for its analysis
prior to issuance of the preliminary determination. This delay,
coupled with the fact that there remained ample opportunity
for further investigation prior to issuance of a final determina-
tion, led the court to conclude that the plaintiffs did not suffer
enough hardship to warrant intrusion into the administrative
process.15
More recently, in Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States,' 6 the
CAFC determined that the "best information available" stan-
dard does not necessarily mean the best possible information,
but the best information that the agency can find within the
statute's strict time limits. Atlantic Sugar involved a final injury
determination in an antidumping case.' 7  In considering
whether the regional industry had been materially injured or
threatened with injury by less than fair value imports, the ITC
utilized data that was not confined to the corporation's opera-
tions within the eleven state region involved. The CIT twice
rejected the ITC's determination on the ground that it was not
the best information available because the ITC had utilized ag-
gregate data which included information from outside the re-
gion being investigated. The CAFC reversed, and reinstated
the antidumping order. The court noted that the ITC had cor-
rectly invoked the best information rule in utilizing the aggre-
gate data and that inclusion of data from outside the region
was not so debilitating as to render the ITC's final determina-
13. 1 CIT at 75, 507 F. Supp. at 1003-04.
14. 4 CIT 244, 553 F. Supp. 394 (1982).
15. 4 CIT at 245-46, 553 F. Supp. at 395-96.
16. 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
17. 744 F.2d at 1559-60. The International Trade Commission (ITC) is the
agency charged with determining whether an industry in the United States is materi-
ally injured or threatened with material injury, or whether the establishment of an
industry in the United States is materially retarded by reason of imports, or sales (or
the likelihood of sales for importation of merchandise with respect to which Com-
merce has made an affirmative less than fair value (LTFV) determination under 19
U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(l)(1982)). See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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tion unsupported by substantial evidence.' 8
C. Scope of an Administrative Order
Questions regarding the proper scope of an administrative
finding or order have also come before the courts over the past
five years. Ever since passage of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979,'9 authority to determine the scope of an investigation
has rested with Commerce. Nevertheless, the courts have had
an opportunity to rule upon the parameters of agency discre-
tion in this area, and have done so in quite a few cases.
For example, in Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. United
States,20 the plaintiff sought to compel the Customs Service to
liquidate certain entries without imposition of antidumping
duties on the ground that the imported merchandise was not
within the scope of the antidumping duty order that described
the imported merchandise as portable electric typewriters pro-
vided for under item 676.0510, Tariff Schedules of the United
States (TSUS). In denying the plaintiff's application, the CIT
stated:
Each stage of the statutory proceeding maintains the scope
passed on from the previous stage. Thus, the class or kind
of merchandise described in the petition, which becomes
the subject of investigation under 19 U.S.C. 1673a(c)(2), is
the subject of the preliminary injury determination of 19
U.S.C. 1673b, the suspension of liquidation under 19
U.S.C. 1673b(d), the possible terminations or suspensions
of 19 U.S.C. 1673c, and the final determinations of 19
U.S.C. 1673d. 21
The typewriter had been included in the merchandise de-
scribed in the antidumping petition, the final sales at less than
fair value determination, and the ITC's material injury deter-
mination. The antidumping duty order subsequently issued
was "directed to portable electric typewriters and [the order]
defined the term by reference to item 676.0510, Tariff Sched-
ules of the United States (TSUS), a statistical extension (for
portable electric typewriters) of the TSUS item 676.05, cover-
18. 744 F.2d at 1562-64.
19. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) [hereinafter The 1979 Act].
20. 1 CIT 80, 507 F. Supp. 1007 (1980), aft'd, 669 F.2d 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
21. 1 CIT at 87, 507 F. Supp. at 1014.
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ing all typewriters."2 Yet the description of the merchandise
contained in the order was the same as that used at the outset
of the investigation.
The plaintiff persistently argued to Commerce that the
typewriter was not portable and continued to do so after publi-
cation of the order. Finally, Commerce sought advice from the
Customs Service, which concluded that the typewriter was a
non-portable electric typewriter within TSUS item 676.0540, and
was thus outside the scope of the antidumping order and mate-
rial injury finding. Nevertheless, Commerce evidently contin-
ued to regard the typewriter as one falling within the scope of
the antidumping order.23
The court upheld Commerce, noting that the final an-
tidumping order "is not the final expression of the administra-
tive determinations ... [but] really the first step in the enforcement
of the consequences mandated by statute when it has been de-
termined that certain articles are being sold at less than their
fair value and are materially injuring a domestic industry. ' 24
The court further observed that the final order must express
the result of the previous determinations "without alterations"
by Commerce or by the Customs Service.25
To similar effect is Diversified Products Corp. v. United States,26
in which the CIT reaffirmed the agency's authority to make
scope determinations irrespective of tariff classification deter-
minations of the Customs Service. The court went even fur-
ther by recognizing that Commerce has the authority to deter-
mine whether new products, not even in existence at the time of the
initial dumping findings, are within the scope of the finding.27
The Diversified Products court also endorsed the following crite-
ria for making determinations as to whether imported products
are within the class or kind of merchandise embraced by an
antidumping finding: general physical characteristics of the
merchandise, cost, ultimate use, channels of distribution and
22. 1 CIT at 83, 507 F. Supp. at 1010-11.
23. 1 CIT at 84, 507 F. Supp. at 1011.
24. 1 CIT at 86, 507 F. Supp. at 1012-13 (emphasis in original).
25. 1 CIT at 86-87, 507 F. Supp. at 1013. Since the plaintiff's aggrievement was
inclusion in the final determination, and the action had not been brought unde 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) to contest the factual findings or legal conclusions underlying
the determination, the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
26. 6 CIT 155, 572 F. Supp. 883 (1983).
27. 6 CIT at 158-60, 572 F. Supp. at 886-88.
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purchaser's expectations.2 8
The relevance of these factors to all scope determinations
involving new products was discussed in two subsequent cases,
Kyowa Gas Chemical Industry Co. v. United States (Kyowa I),29 and
Kyowa Gas Chemical Industry Co. v. United States, (Kyowa II).3°
The issue in Kyowa I was whether a product known as Ky-
owaglas-XA was within the scope of an antidumping finding
involving Acrylic Sheet from Japan."1 In resolving this question,
Commerce did not examine the Diversified Products criteria, but
instead reviewed the descriptions of the product in the peti-
tion, initial investigation, and the ITC's determination.
32
Based on these factors, Commerce published notice of the final
results of its administrative review of the antidumping finding
on Acrylic Sheet and concluded that the Kyowaglas-XA was
acrylic sheet subject to the finding. In that notice, Commerce
outlined a two-step process which it claimed to use in resolving
scope questions. The process involved: 1) an examination of
"the descriptions of the product contained in the petition, the
initial investigation, and the ITC, Treasury, or Commerce De-
terminations" to ascertain whether the product description is
vague and, if so, 2) application of the Diversified Products criteria
to determine whether a newly imported product not previously
included within the scope of an antidumping finding is within
the class or kind of merchandise contemplated by the find-
ing.33
Judge Boe rejected the two-step process and remanded
the case to Commerce directing that it apply the Diversified
Products criteria and consider all relevant evidentiary facts in
light of those criteria in making its determination. Specifically,
Judge Boe stated that "[n]either precedent nor authority has
been submitted to substantiate the newly enunciated ITA stan-
dard. When the record is replete with differing evidentiary
facts upon which the [Diversified Products] criteria may be appli-
cable, the court is unable to accept this qualified application"
which conditions their use upon a preliminary finding that the
28. 6 CIT at 162, 572 F. Supp. at 889.
29. 7 CIT 138, 582 F. Supp. 887 (1984).
30. 7 CIT 311 (1984).
31. 7 CIT at 138, 582 F. Supp. at 888.
32. 7 CIT at 139, 582 F. Supp. at 888.
33. Acrylic Sheet from Japan, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,490 (1983) (final admin. review).
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initial product description is vague.34
In reviewing the redetermination in Kyowa H, ChiefJudge
Re again rejected Commerce's two-tiered approach in favor of
one which would go directly to consideration of the Diversified
Products criteria. Specifically, he stated that "in every scope de-
termination involving a new product, the ITA should examine
the product in light of the Diversified Products criteria to deter-
mine whether the product is of the class or kind of merchan-
dise contemplated by the pertinent antidumping finding."35
Chief Judge Re then went even further, stating that the court
"mandates that the ITA apply the pertinent criteria to deter-
mine whether a new product is within the confines of the or-
der.""6 In its redetermination, Commerce had again referred
to the two-step process which it claimed was its practice in
scope determinations under Section 751. However, since
Commerce had applied the Diversified Products criteria and
otherwise complied with the remand order issued in Kyowa I,
the CIT upheld Commerce's redetermination as supported by
substantial evidence, and directed it to issue a clarification rul-
ing on the merchandise involved.3 7
A more recent decision regarding scope is Alsthom Atlan-
tique and Cogenel, Inc. v. United States,38 in which the CAFC re-
versed the CIT's decision that Commerce is empowered to
modify the scope of an antidumping finding made by the De-
partment of the Treasury.39 In this case, the Notice of An-
tidumping Proceeding embraced "large power transformers
... 4. 40 The final dumping finding issued by the Treasury es-
tablished a dumping margin of 24% ad valorem, but did not
mention shunt reactors.41 Also, there was no finding of less
than fair value (LTFV) sales as to shunt reactors other than
34. 7 CIT at 140, 582 F. Supp. at 889.
35. 7 CIT at 312.
36. 7 CIT at 313 (emphasis added).
37. 7 CIT at 313.
38. 787 F.2d 565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
39. 787 F.2d at 571. The Court of International Trade's decision is reported at
604 F. Supp. 1234 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
40. Large Power Transformers from France, 35 Fed. Reg. 9934 (1970) (an-
tidumping notice).
41. Large Power Transformers from France, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,772 (1972) (an-
tidumping determination); see Large Power Transformers from France, 47 Fed. Reg.
10,269 (1982) (final admin. review).
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those within the class or kind of merchandise described as
large power transformers. There was also no evidence of any
shipments of shunt reactors from France, the country from
which the plaintiff's merchandise was exported, during the in-
vestigatory period.4 2
In its section 751 review, Commerce concluded that the
plaintiff's shunt reactors were within the class or kind of mer-
chandise subject to Treasury's dumping determination and
that it could not change the scope of Treasury's finding.4 3 The
CIT disagreed. Based on its reading of the legislative history
of the antidumping law, the court concluded that Commerce
was able to review LTFV determinations underlying Treasury
orders, because to hold otherwise could force the agency to
follow an erroneous Treasury order which would frustrate,
rather than further, Congressional intent to transfer authority
in antidumping matters to Commerce.44
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that although Com-
merce is empowered, in a section 751 review, to determine
whether an article is within the scope of an original antidump-
ing finding, "the ITA cannot change the scope of an underly-
ing antidumping determination when Treasury has specifically
included the article within the scope of its underlying determi-
nation." 45 Since Treasury had specifically included shunt reac-
tors within the class or kind of merchandise subject to investi-
gation, shunt reactors were within the scope of its antidumping
determination. The Federal Circuit did not address the lower
court's concern that Commerce might be forced to follow an
erroneous Treasury order. Instead, it concluded that Com-
merce is not obligated to review de novo whether Treasury
correctly included certain merchandise within the scope of the
determination, and, indeed, cannot substitute its judgment for
that exercised by the Treasury Department.
46
42. 787 F.2d at 568.
43. Large Power Transformers from France, 47 Fed. Reg. 10,268-69 (1982) (fi-
nal admin. review).
44. 604 F. Supp. at 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
45. 787 F.2d at 571 (emphasis in original) (citing 507 F. Supp. 1007 (CIT 1980),
aff'd, 669 F.2d 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
46. 787 F.2d at 571.
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D. Deposit and Assessment of Duties
The courts have also interpreted statutory requirements
involving deposit and assessment of antidumping and counter-
vailing duties. For example, in Asahi Chemical Industry Co. v.
United States,4 7 the court was faced with the question of whether
cash deposits of estimated antidumping duties could be re-
quired where no shipments of dumped merchandise occur dur-
ing a review period. Commerce had initially determined that
the weighted average margin on sales of spun acrylic yarn from
Asahi was 29.05% ad valorem.48 The ITC subsequently deter-
mined that the yarn was causing material injury to the United
States industry.49 Accordingly, Commerce ordered the impo-
sition of antidumping duties on shipments of Asahi spun
acrylic yarn imported into the United States.50
During the administrative review conducted pursuant to
section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Commerce found that
Asahi had not shipped spun acrylic yarn to the United States at
any time during the review period. It nevertheless required a
deposit of estimated antidumping duties equal to the weighted
average margin of dumping established as a result of the fair
value investigation. 5' The court upheld Commerce's review
determination, noting that:
Congress was primarily concerned with the collection of an-
tidumping duties once an antidumping duty order had is-
sued, not with providing exceptions to or avoidance of such
collection .... [and that] Congress intended that in the as-
certainment of LTFV margins, actual entries, sales and
purchases of merchandise be utilized, not their absence. 52
The court then held that the statute and legislative history sup-
ported Commerce's construction of the law and its use of the
most recent price and value information available based on ac-
47. 4 CIT 120, 548 F. Supp. 1261 (CIT 1982).
48. Spun Acrylic Yarn from Japan, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,492, 61,493 (1979) (LTFV
determination).
49. Spun Acrylic Yarn from Japan, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,682, 19,683 (1980) (mat'l
injury determination).
50. Spun Acrylic Yarn from Japan, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,127 (1980) (antidumping
order).
51. Spun Acrylic Yarn from Japan, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,929 (1981) (prelim. results
of admin. review).
52. 548 F. Supp. at 1265.
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tual entries, sales and purchases of merchandise.53
Another novel issue that has come before the courts is
whether retroactive assessment of countervailing duties is con-
trary to the statutory framework which provides for assessment
of countervailing duties and governs liquidations of entries
subject to such duties. This issue arose in Ambassador Division of
Florsheim Shoe v. United States,54 in which an importer of leather
footwear from India challenged the final results of the first ad-
ministrative review of a countervailing duty order. Through-
out the pendency of the administrative review proceedings, liq-
uidation of entries of the footwear subject to the counter-
vailing duty order had been suspended and no countervailing
duties had been finally assessed. Once the results of the review
were published in 1982, Commerce directed Customs to liqui-
date the suspended entries and assess countervailing duties at
the rates of 15.08% ad valorem for footwear and 12.58% ad
valorem for lasted leather uppers.55
The CIT interpreted the countervailing duty law and 19
U.S.C. § 150456 as requiring that the results of periodic admin-
istrative reviews have only prospective application. Under the
CIT's approach the entries embraced by the review period
would have been deemed liquidated by operation of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1504 within one year of being entered. It would thus follow
that the first entries or withdrawals of merchandise from the
warehouse to which the 1980 investigation could apply would
be those made after publication in February 1982 of the results
of the administrative review.
The CAFC reversed, observing that although the CIT
might "be right as a matter of cold textual analysis," its inter-
pretation "produces absurd results ... that were not and could
not have been within the contemplation of Congress."' 58 In
short, unless the statutory scheme were interpreted as permit-
53. Id. at 1266.
54. 748 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
55. 748 F.2d at 1562.
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1504 states, inter alia, that subject to certain exceptions, an entry
of merchandise not liquidated within one year from the date of entry, or the date of
the final withdrawal of all such merchandise covered by a warehouse entry, shall be
deemed liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duties asserted
at the time of entry by the importer, his consignee, or agent.
57. 6 CIT at 275, 280, 577 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (1983).
58. 748 F.2d at 1563.
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ting suspension of liquidation of entries subject to counter-
vailing duties and retroactive assessment of duties after com-
pletion of an administrative review, Commerce would be pre-
cluded from acting on its factual findings with respect to the
very year in which they applied. Thus the government would
be unable to add to the liquidated amount of each entry the
applicable countervailing duty.59 Therefore the CAFC held
that suspension of liquidation of entries subject to counter-
vailing duties was not prohibited by 19 U.S.C. § 1504, and that
the countervailing duty law must be construed as permitting
retroactive assessments.60
E. Settlement Authority
Both the CIT and CAFC have upheld Commerce's author-
ity under section 617 of the Tariff Act of 1930,61 to compro-
mise claims arising under the customs laws, including claims
for antidumping duties. The courts addressed this issue in
Committee to Preserve American Color Television (COMPACT) v.
United States.62 Aside from clarifying Commerce's power under
19 U.S.C. § 1617, the COMPACT decisions also indicate that
the merits and substance of a settlement recommendation, as
well as the reasons underlying such a recommendation, are im-
mune from judicial scrutiny.
F. Antidumping Law and Methodology
A number of cases involving interpretation of the an-
tidumping law and challenges to Commerce methodology in
administering the law have arisen over the years. Perhaps the
most extensively litigated issues in this area involve the
agency's determinations of foreign market value and its allow-
ance or disallowance of adjustments thereto. The cases thus
far indicate that Commerce has considerable discretion in in-
terpreting and applying the law, and that the courts are ex-
tremely hesitant to disturb Commerce's findings.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1562, 1565.
61. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 617 (codified as amended in 19 U.S.C. § 1617
(1982)).
62. 2 CIT 208, 527 F. Supp. 341 (1981), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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1. Method of Determining Foreign Market Value
For example, in reviewing Commerce's foreign market
value computation in the case of Silver Reed America, Inc. v.
United States, 63 the CIT held that where home market sales
amounted to 8.6% of total sales to third countries other than
the United States, Commerce correctly determined FMV on
the basis of home market sales without regard to comparisons
of the size of the home market with the United States market.
In reaching this conclusion, the CIT essentially upheld Com-
merce's regulation set forth at 19 C.F.R. § 353.4, which pro-
vides a five percent market test to be used in determining
whether the quantity of merchandise sold for consumption in
the country of exportation is so small in relation to the quan-
tity sold for exportation to countries other than to the United
States as to be an inadequate basis for determining the foreign
market value of merchandise by reference to home market
sales.64
Similarly, in Southwest Florida Winter Vegetable Growers Associ-
ation v. United States,6 5 the CIT approved Commerce's practice
of determining the adequacy of third country sales as a basis
for computing foreign market value. Commerce compares the
volume of such sales to the volume of sales in the United
States. The court upheld Commerce's view that third country
sales constituting approximately 20% of United States sales
were adequate for comparison purposes and within established
administrative guidelines for determining the adequacy of
third country sales. 66
The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that con-
structed value, rather than third country sales, should have
been utilized by the Commerce Department. The court ob-
served that the law exhibited a preference for third country
sales, and that the use in this case of constructed value would
have been inappropriate given certain economic factors in the
case, namely the perishable nature of produce and the suscep-
tibility of the fresh winter vegetable market to wide price fluc-
63. 581 F. Supp. 1290 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Con-
sumer Prods. Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed Am., Inc., 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
64. 581 F. Supp. at 1297.
65. 7 CIT 99, 584 F. Supp. 10 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
66. 7 CIT at 103, 584 F. Supp. at 15.
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tuations. These factors made it a necessary practice for many
sales to be below the average cost of production. "The use of
a price arrived at by constructed value would necessarily give
the appearance of dumping even though sellers would be act-
ing in a normal . . . manner in light of industry demands. 67
Thus, constructed value would be inappropriate as a basis for
determining foreign market value because it would require
finding that an economically necessary business practice is un-
fair.68
The court also upheld Commerce's decision to consider
below cost sales in determining foreign market value when
such sales constituted up to 50% of a grower's total sales of
the merchandise under consideration. 69 Below cost sales in
the fresh winter vegetable market were "common and ex-
pected" due to the perishability of the merchandise and the
seasonal nature of the market. Thus, because there was sub-
stantial evidence in the record indicating that the below cost
sales were "made in the normal course of trade at prices that
permit full cost recovery within a reasonable period of time,"
the court concluded that Commerce had properly regarded
those sales in its determination of foreign market value.7 °
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,7' the CIT likewise up-
held Commerce's decision to turn to constructed value rather
than home market prices as a basis for determining foreign
market value. Notwithstanding the existence of evidence as to
the declared amounts on which foreign producers paid Japa-
nese Commodity Tax, which constituted secondary sources of
information as to price, the court concluded that when actual
home market prices were inadequate for comparison purposes,
Commerce was under no obligation to use secondary sources
of price before turning to an alternative statutory method of
valuation.72
2. Adjustments to Foreign Market Value
A similar trend of judicial deference to the administrative
67. 7 CIT at 103, 584 F. Supp. at 14.
68. Id.
69. 7 CIT at 103, 584 F. Supp. at 15.
70. 7 CIT at 104, 105, 584 F. Supp. at 16.
71. No. 81-06-00734, slip op. 85-30 (Ct. Int'l Trade March 13, 1985).
72. Slip op. 85-30 at 8, 10-11.
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agency is evident in the cases dealing with adjustments to for-
eign market value. For example, in Brother Industries, Ltd. v.
United States,73 the CIT found that the antidumping law re-
quired that a causal link between differences in circumstances
of sale and differentials between United States price and for-
eign market value must be established only to the satisfaction
of the administering authority, and that Commerce's regula-
tion on this subject 74 was a reasonable exercise of authority
under the antidumping law. The CAFC agreed, also noting
that the statute gives the Secretary of Commerce broad discre-
tion in making adjustments.75
Brother also marked the start of a dispute regarding the va-
lidity of the so-called Exporter's Sales Price (ESP) offset. Pur-
suant to regulation Commerce may make comparisons and ad-
justments using exporter's sale price, and "reasonable allow-
ance will be made for all actual selling expenses incurred in the
home market up to the amount of the selling expenses in-
curred in the United States market."76 The offset, which al-
lows adjustments to foreign market value that reduce the
dumping margin, was upheld by the CAFC, inasmuch as the
offset permits a fair value comparison on an "apples to apples"
basis. 7 Thus, the court regarded the offset as a proper and
reasonable exercise of Commerce's authority to administer the
antidumping law.78
In Silver Reed America, Inc. v. United States, 79 the CIT de-
parted from its ordinary course and held that Commerce had
acted arbitrarily and beyond its authority in limiting or capping
the ESP offset for home market selling expenses to the amount
of selling expenses incurred in the United States. The CAFC,
however, disagreed and reversed the CIT's decision in Con-
sumer Products Division, S. C.M. Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc.' 0
In the CAFC's view, the cap on the ESP offset did no more
than prevent undue distortion of the price comparison in favor
73. 3 CIT 125, 540 F. Supp. 1341 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Smith-Corona Group v.
United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
74. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(a) (1986).
75. 3 CIT at 130-32, 540 F. Supp. at 1348-52; 713 F.2d at 1575-77.
76. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1986).
77. 713 F.2d at 1574, 1578.
78. 713 F.2d at 1579.
79. 7 CIT 23, 581 F. Supp. 1290 (1984).
80. 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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of foreign manufacturers. Accordingly, the court upheld the
validity of Commerce's ESP offset regulation,"1 including the
ESP offset cap, as a reasonable exercise of administrative au-
thority. 2
Other issues raised in the Smith-Corona, Brother and Silver
Reed cases as well as in other cases include: 1) the propriety of
after-sale rebate adjustments to the foreign market value of
merchandise based on total sales; 2) adjustments for advertis-
ing; 3) technical services expenses; 4) inland freight charges
incurred in the home market; 5) differences in physical charac-
teristics of the merchandise; and 6) differences in levels of
trade. As indicated below, in most instances, Commerce's de-
cision has been upheld.
For example, in Smith-Corona the CAFC upheld Com-
merce's determination to allow after-sale rebate adjustments to
the foreign market value of portable electric typewriters based
on total sales of all merchandise subject to the rebate program,
where the rebates were apportioned to correlate with appro-
priate sales of portable electric typewriters.8 3 The court also
found that advertising expenses may be a basis for adjusting
foreign market value even if multiple products are being adver-
tised, so long as the portion of advertising expense directly re-
lated to the sales of merchandise under investigation during
the relevant period can be isolated and identified to the satis-
faction of Commerce. 4
Similarly, in Rhone Poulenc, S.A. v. United States,8 5 the CIT
found that although technical service expenses may be differ-
ences in circumstances of sale requiring adjustment to foreign
market value, Commerce properly disallowed a claimed adjust-
ment based on technical expenses. These expenses were not
directly related to the sales under consideration, but were pro-
vided for the more general purposes of research and maximiz-
ing future sales through developing new uses for the plaintiff's
products.8 6
In Silver Reed, however, the court disagreed with Com-
81. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1986).
82. 753 F.2d at 1040.
83. 713 F.2d at 1579-80.
84. Id. at 1581-82.
85. 8 CIT 47, 592 F. Supp. 1318 (1984).
86. 592 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
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merce's disallowance of an adjustment based on differences in
levels of trade based on the fact that "large wholesale quanti-
ties" of merchandise were sold to customers at different levels
of trade in the foreign and U.S. markets. The court noted that
Commerce should have focused on whether the data submitted
supported a finding that different levels of trade affected price
comparibility and whether the claimed adjustment was duly
quantified based on proof of higher expenses in selling to re-
tailers in the home market rather than to wholesalers.87
Another area in which the CIT disagreed with Commerce
involved adjustments to foreign market value for differences in
tax treatment of merchandise sold for exportation. In Zenith
Electronics Corp. v. United States,8 8 the CIT held that Commerce
had abused its discretion by deducting from foreign market
value the actual amount of indirect commodity tax imposed on
home market merchandise. The statute provides that Com-
merce estimate the amount of indirect tax forgiven on ex-
ported merchandise, measure the amount of tax absorption in
home market sales and add that amount to the United States
price.89 The court remanded the case to Commerce and di-
rected that it calculate the appropriate adjustment to United
States price in a manner consistent with its opinion, which had
suggested that Commerce could calculate the adjustment us-
ing an econometric analysis.9 0 Commerce seized upon this
methodology and incorporated it into a special questionnaire
intended to elicit information purportedly necessary to deter-
mine the effect, if any, of the commodity tax on the price of the
merchandise sold in Japan.9 1 Numerous parties to the pro-
ceeding objected to the econometric methodology and the
commodity tax questionnaire because it was extremely burden-
som and more accurate methodologies were available. Com-
merce was thus prompted to hold a hearing on this subject. 2
Subsequently, the agency reissued a shortened version of the
87. 581 F. Supp. at 1295-96.
88. 633 F. Supp. 1382 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
89. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1982).
90. 633 F. Supp. at 1402.
91. Antidumping Questionnaire (August 25, 1986) (copies available at the law
offices of Weil, Gotshal & Manges).
92. Antidumping Hearing on: Television Receiver Sets, Monochrome and Color, From Ja-
pan, United States Department of Commerce, Antidumping Duty Division, October
10, 1986 (available at the law offices of Weil, Gotshal & Manges).
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commodity tax questionnaire, but adhered to the econometric
approach which the court had suggested was appropriate.93 In
view of the fact that the decision in this case could affect virtu-
ally every antidumping case involving products from a country
that forgives indirect taxes on exported merchandise, it is ex-
pected that the case will be litigated further.
G. Countervailing Duty Law and Methodology
Litigation involving the countervailing duty (CVD) law has
focused on such issues as the scope of the law, the practices or
programs that constitute subsidies, and whether valuation of
the subsidies by the administrative agency has been done in
accordance with law. In these cases, unlike the antidumping
area, the courts appear to have reversed as many agency deter-
minations as they have upheld.
1. Applicability of Countervailing Duty Law
to Non-Market Economies
One of the more significant recent decisions involving
countervailing duty law was Continental Steel Corp. v. United
States.94 The CIT held that the CVD law could be applied to
nonmarket economy countries (NME) thus flatly rejecting
Commerce's position that subsidies can exist only where a free
market exists.95
The CIT noted that the language of the statute was com-
pletely indifferent to variations in economic structure, and ob-
served that it was purposely drafted to embrace all possible
conveyors of subsidies, forms of conveyance, levels of com-
mercial activity, and methods of importation.96 The CIT also
found that subsequent legislation, such as amendment of the
antidumping law to provide a reference point for measuring
whether or not sales of merchandise from state-controlled
economies were being made at less than fair market value,
were irrelevant to whether the CVD law applied to NME coun-
tries. Unlike the antidumping law, the CVD law did not re-
93. Revised Antidumping Questionnaire, (October 24, 1986) (copies available
at the law offices of Weil, Gotshal & Manges).
94. 614 F. Supp. 548 (1985), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United
States, 801 F. 2d. 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
95. 614 F. Supp. at 550.
96. Id. at 551.
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quire a market value reference point in order to determine
whether a bounty or grant was being provided.97
Nor was the CIT persuaded by Commerce's reference to
section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 and congressional ap-
proval of the Subsidies Code in the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 as indications of a legislative intent to exclude NME's
from the reach of the CVD law. In the court's view, section
406 was a separate remedy to combat market disruption
caused by imports from Communist countries; it did not affect
applicability of the countervailing duty law.98 As to the Subsi-
dies Code, the court found that the choice of dumping or
countervailing duty remedies available thereunder compelled a
conclusion that the countervailing duty law did apply to non-
market economy countries.99
The court also fundamentally disagreed with Commerce's
definition of the term "subsidy" as a distortion of the opera-
tion of a market economy. Viewing subsidization as "the en-
couragement of exportation by means of some type of special
preference," the court declared that "if [subsidy] has to be
stated in terms of distortion then it is a distortion of a pattern
of regularity or even a pattern of reasonably expected fair-
ness. ' '100 The court expressly left refinement of its definition
and discussion of the methods of detecting subsidies within a
NME country for the future, stating that discernment and mea-
surement of subsidies are matters which fall squarely within
Commerce's authority and expertise.'1
The Federal Circuit's decision in Georgetown Steel Corp. v.
United States,10 2 squarely reversed the decision of the Court of
International Trade, and ended the ongoing controversy re-
garding the applicability of the CVD law to NME imports.
In considering the scope of the law, the Federal Circuit
observed that at the time of its original enactment as section 5
of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897,103 no NMEs existed. Thus,
the enacting legislature had no occasion to consider whether
97. Id. at 555-56.
98. Id. at 555.
99. Id. at 556-57.
100. Id. at 554.
101. Id.
102. 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
103. Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (1897).
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the countervailing duty law could be appropriately invoked
against imports from NMEs. In NMEs decisions respecting in-
vestment, production, pricing and exportation are determined
by a central planning authority rather than by operation of
market principles of supply and demand. 04 These factors in-
dicated to the court that the statute's expansive language did
not, as the lower court opined, demonstrate a purposeful at-
tempt to embrace within the countervailing duty law all possi-
ble beneficial acts by all countries, regardless of economic
structure.
The court likewise rejected the CIT's position that exclu-
sion of NMEs from the reach of the countervailing duty law
was contrary to the purpose of the statute. Whereas the lower
court's opinion stated that the sole purpose of the law was to
protect domestic industry from the effects of subsidies con-
ferred by any country on merchandise entering the United
States, 0 5 the Federal Circuit took a more limited view. The
CAFC recognized, as has the United States Supreme Court,
that the countervailing duty law was intended to offset only
those unfair competitive advantages that foreign producers en-
joy due to export subsidies paid by their governments: 0 6
A government subsidy on sales to the United States
.... enabled a foreign producer to sell in the American
market in a situation in which otherwise it would not be in
the seller's best economic interest to do so .... It was this
kind of 'unfair' competition, resulting from subsidies to for-
eign producers that gave them a competitive advantage they
otherwise would not have, against which Congress sought
to protect in the countervailing duty law.' 0
7
In the court's view, even benefits such as those alleged in the
underlying countervailing duty investigations, namely, dual ex-
change rates, direct price equalization payments on exports
104. See 801 F.2d at 1315.
105. 614 F. Supp. at 553.
106. 801 F.2d at 1315 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,
455-56 (1978)). In Zenith, the Supreme Court stated the purpose of the counter-
vailing duty law as follows:
The countervailing duty was intended to offset the unfair competitive advan-
tage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies
paid by their governments.
107. See 801 F.2d at 1315.
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and retention by exporting countries of a portion of hard cur-
rency earned on foreign sales, did not confer countervailable
subsidies.' Specifically, the court stated:
Although these benefits may encourage those entities
to accomplish the economic goals and objectives the central
planners set for them . . . they do not create the kind of
unfair competitive advantage over American firms against
which the countervailing duty act was directed.
There is no reason to believe that if the Soviet Union or
the German Democratic Republic had sold the potash di-
rectly rather than through a government instrumentality,
the product would have been sold in the United States at
higher prices or on different terms. Unlike the situation in a
competitive market economy, the economic incentives the
state provided to the exporting entities did not enable those
entities to make sales in the United States that they other-
wise might not have made.10 9
Moreover, continued the court, even if such incentives
could be considered subsidies in the loosest sense of the word,
the governments of NMEs would be subsidizing themselves,
which is not the kind of "unfair" practice intended to fall
within the law's reach.'l 0
In examining the underlying purpose of the counter-
vailing duty law, the Federal Circuit agreed with Commerce's
definition of the term "subsidy" as a distortion of the opera-
tion of a market economy."' The CAFC futher agreed with the
agency's view, shared by a variety of commentators, that, logi-
cally, a NME country cannot subsidize the manufacture, pro-
duction or export of particular merchandise, since decisions
respecting investment, production, pricing, and exportation
are predetermined and enforced by a central planning author-
ity."12 In doing so, the CAFC again came out on the opposite
side of the decision below, which rejected Commerce's conclu-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1315-16 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 1316.
111. Id. at 1315.
112. Id. at 1315; See generally P. MARER, PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES IN CEN-
TRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES, FOCUSING ON THE USSR AND GDR (1984); G.M. PICK-
ERSGILL & JE. PICKERSGILL, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE
VIEW, 208, 232-33 (1974); Potter, East-West Countertrade: Economic Injury and Depen-
dence Under U.S. Trade Law, 13 LAW POL'Y INT'L Bus. 413, 415-16 (1981) (citing State-
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sion that bounties or grants simply cannot exist in NMEs. l l3 It
also implicitly disposed of the lower court's murky description
of subsidization as a "distortion of a pattern of regularity or
reasonably expected fairness,"' 14 thereby eliminating potential
problems of discerning and measuring benefits arising from
unfair variations in such "patterns" presumed by the lower
court to exist in NMEs.
In another clear departure from the lower court's deci-
sion, the Federal Circuit attached considerable significance to
legislative developments after enactment of the countervailing
duty law and to the existence of a statutory remedy specifically
tailored to address the problem of NME import competition.
In particular, it noted that the statutory language regarding the
scope of the countervailing duty law remained materially un-
changed from the time of its original enactment. This silence,
in the face of contemporaneous legislation amending the an-
tidumping law, demonstrated to the court a legislative recogni-
tion that the countervailing duty law is unsuitable to address
import competition from NMEs, as well as the congressional
intent that NME imports at unreasonably low prices be dealt
with under our antidumping law." t5
Finally, the CAFC disagreed with the lower court that con-
gressional approval of the Subsidies Code with knowledge that
NME countries had participated in the Code's preparation,
constituted "overwhelming evidence" that Congress under-
stood the countervailing duty law to apply to NMEs. Instead, it
ment by Myer Rashish, Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, before the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, U.S. Congress, July 14, 1981).
113. See Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 553 (1985),
rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
114. Id. at 554.
115. See 801 F.2d at 1316-17. Congress amended the antidumping law to deal
specifically with imports from NMEs in the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88
Stat. 1978 (1975) [hereinafter the 1974 Act] and in the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, The 1979 Act, supra note 19.
Congress' realization, reflected in both the 1974 and 1979 Acts, that
changes in the antidumping law were necessary to make that law more effec-
tive in dealing with exports from nonmarket economies, coupled with its
silence about application of the countervailing duty law to such exports,
strongly indicates that Congress did not believe that the latter law covered
nonmarket economies.
801 F. 2d at 1317.
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concluded that the Code merely prescribed alternative methods
for detecting and measuring subsidies, leaving each country to
choose the method it would employ to address the problem of
NME imports." 6 According to the CAFC, inasmuch as Con-
gress had indicated an intention that NME imports be ad-
dressed under the antidumping law, there was no reason to
believe that it also elected to have the countervailing duty law
apply. 1 7 In the court's view, if the antidumping law were to
prove inadequate to protect United States industry from the
effects of unfair competition from NME imports, then correc-
tive legislation, rather than application of the countervailing
duty law, would be appropriate.'1
8
2. What Constitutes a Subsidy?
a. Domestic Subsidies
A domestic subsidy is defined as one "provided .. .to a
specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or in-
dustries . . . ." 9 In examining whether a program is aimed at
a specific enterprise or industry, Commerce has focused on
whether the program is "generally available." If so, the pro-
gram is not industry specific, and hence, will not be
countervailable.120
The courts have sometimes, but not always, endorsed this
approach. For example, in Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United
States,' 2 1 the court upheld Commerce's determination that spe-
cial income tax deductions available under Korean law to all
manufacturers based on certain record keeping and machinery
utilization requirements, did not grant preferential treatment
to one group of industries or enterprises and, thus, did not
confer a countervailable subsidy.12 2 Similarly, in Bethlehem Steel
116. 801 F. 2d at 1317-18. The Subsidies Code permits a signatory country to
identify and quantify the existence of a subsidy from an NME using either the surro-




119. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982).
120. See, e.g., Certain Refrigeration Compressors from Singapore, 50 Fed. Reg.
30,493, 30,494 (1985); Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg.
24,159, 24,167-68 (1983).
121. 5 CIT 229, 564 F. Supp. 834 (1983).
122. 5 CIT at 235, 564 F. Supp. at 839.
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Corp. v. United States,' 23 the court affirmed a determination by
Commerce that a generally available tax deduction was not a
bounty or grant on the ground that tax laws are not subsidies
to the taxpayer unless the laws are selective in their terms or
administration. 124
Notwithstanding the court's holding in Bethlehem Steel, the
CIT stated in dictum that a broad exception for generally avail-
able benefits is contrary to the plain meaning and intention of
the law.' 21 According to the court, "[t]he only place for a test
of 'general availability' is in the determination of whether a
practice which is normally not a subsidy, but merely a decision
as to the level of an adverse effect, has been transformed into a
subsidy by means of selective application. "126
The question raised in Bethlehem Steel regarding the appro-
priateness of Commerce's "general availability" test as a stan-
dard for determining countervailability of alleged subsidies has
not yet been resolved. In fact, in Cabot Corp. v. United States,127
the court concluded that the "generally available" approach
used by Commerce is an unacceptable legal standard for deter-
mining countervailability of benefits, reasoning that availability
of the benefit is not determinative of whether the benefits actu-
ally received are countervailable subsidies. In the court's view,
an appropriate standard would concentrate first on "the defacto
case by case effect of benefits provided to recipients rather
than on the nominal availability of benefits.' 28 If bestowal
upon a particular class were found, then a second inquiry
would take place to determine whether the bestowal amounted
to an additional benefit or a competitive advantage. 129
The government appealed the Cabot decision, arguing
123. 7 CIT 339, 590 F. Supp. 1237 (1984).
124. 7 CIT at 349, 590 F. Supp. at 1245.
125. In spite of the CIT's disapproval of the "generally available" standard,
Commerce has continued to employ it in subsequent investigations. See, e.g., Certain
Refrigeration Compressors from Singapore, 50 Fed. Reg. at 30,493, 30,494 (1985).
126. 7 CIT at 349, 590 F. Supp. at 1245.
127. No. 83-7-01044, slip op. 85-102 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 4, 1985), appeal dis-
missed, No. 86-729, slip op. 86-729 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 9, 1986).
128. Slip op. 85-102 at 20.
129. Id. at 21. Also, in Agrexco, Agricultural Export Co. v. United States, 604 F.
Supp. 1238 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), the CIT determined that Commerce erred in con-
cluding that government research and development results disseminated to all rose
growers and to the general public were not a subsidy. In the court's view, it was
"immaterial whether the information is disseminated to all groups, but whether the
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against the lower court's substitution of a "competitive advan-
tage" standard for the "generally available" standard tradi-
tionally used by Commerce in analyzing subsidy allegations.
Although the appellate court dismissed the appeal on unre-
lated technical grounds, it specifically stated that "the issue re-
garding the proper legal standard to be applied to countervai-
lability of benefits may be considered on a proper appeal from
the trial court... "130 Thus, it appears that for the time being,
the "generally available" standard is still valid. 3' However, in
view of the court's evident disagreement with Commerce's in-
terpretation of the specificity requirement of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5)(B), Commerce may ultimately be required to
reformulate its approach.
The courts have examined various programs alleged to
constitute domestic subsidies. Highlights of the cases are dis-
cussed below.
i. Provision of Capital
In British Steel Corp. v. United States,' 32 the CIT reviewed a
Commerce determination involving capital allegedly provided
on terms "inconsistent with commercial considerations,"
within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5). The funds in that
case involved equity investments provided by the United King-
dom to the British Steel Company (BSC) during a period of
industry restructuring. Given the deteriorating financial con-
dition and precarious economic situation of BSC, Commerce
determined that investment in BSC was unsound.
In considering whether Commerce correctly found that
the funds provided by the government conferred subsidies, the
court observed that in examining whether government funds
were provided on terms inconsistent with commercial consid-
erations, the "rationality" of the restructuring must not be
considered.
research and development is targeted to assist a particular rather than a general in-
dustry." 604 F. Supp. at 1241-42.
130. Slip op. 86-729 at 12 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
131. Actually, the statute does not require that a program be "generally avail-
able" to escape countervailability; the program need only be provided to more than a
specific industry or group of industries. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (5)(B) (1982).
132. 605 F. Supp. 286 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-2386 (Fed.
Cir. May 20, 1985).
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While government investment in its state-owned enterprises
may indeed be rational in terms of national policy, such in-
vestment may not be consistent with commercial considera-
tions, depending upon the soundness and terms of the in-
vestment. However, neither the reasonableness of the ac-
tion taken by the government, nor the results ultimately
achieved (viewed in retrospect), are pertinent to the 'com-
mercial considerations' test.1
3 3
The court agreed with Commerce that the British govern-
ment's equity investments were made on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations. The court also agreed with
Commerce that government funds used for closure of ineffi-
cient plants and discharge of a redundant workforce are
countervailable, since they enhance the recipient's efficiency
and relieve the recipient of significant financial burdens. As
such, the funds provided indirect benefits to the BSC's manu-
facture, production or export of steel, and they are
countervailable on the basis of the amount of funding the BSC
received. 134
Also countervailable were funds used by BSC to acquire
capital assets prematurely retired in the course of restructur-
ing. The court found that "the competitive benefit of funds
used to acquire assets does not cease upon the assets' prema-
ture retirement, but rather such benefit continues to contrib-
ute to the firm's manufacture, production, or exportation of
products accomplished by the firm's remaining assets."' 3 5
Furthermore, since the equity investments in the BSC
benefited all of its remaining manufacturing and exporting op-
erations by eliminating excess capacity and unnecessary work-
ers, the court agreed with the ITA that it is unnecessary to
trace the use of the funds or find that they directly related to
enhancing product competitiveness. "General financial benefit
to the production is sufficient to support a determination of
subsidy and a quantification of exact competitive benefit to the
products need not enter into the allocation of the benefit."'' 36
133. 605 F. Supp. at 293.
134. Id. at 293-94.
135. Id. at 296.
136. Id. at 296 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 4 CIT 252, 255
(1982), vacated, No. 75-9-02467, slip op. 85-11 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 28, 1985)). The
Michelin case was vacated based on a Submission on Agreed Statement of Facts and
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ii. Loans
The statute provides that loans, like provision of capital,
are not subsidies unless provided on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations. 137 In Michelin Tire Corp. v. United
States,' 3 8 the court explained that in determining whether a
loan from the government is a subsidy, the appropriate stan-
dard for comparison involves the same type of financing of-
fered: (a) on comparable terms and conditions, (b) in an ap-
propriate commercial market to which the recipient has access,
(c) on or about the date when the interest rate on the loan was
fixed.' 39 Using this guideline, the court concluded that the
loans involved in Michelin conferred a bounty, because the in-
terest rate of 6% was appreciably lower than the 7.56% rate
which Michelin would otherwise have paid.140
The CIT also found that a deferral of the first seven loan
repayments constituted a countervailable benefit, noting that
"[lt]he removal of the necessity of making a payment of princi-
pal has a value separate and apart from the value of the new
loan in which the deferred principal is incorporated."' 4' The
court disagreed with Commerce's calculation of the benefit,
stating that the benefit of the deferral itself is limited to a sin-
gle principal amount. 42 If benefits are found to exist in the
years after the year of deferral, they are not more than the in-
terest ramifications, the conventional financing benefits of the
deferral. 43
iii. Research and Development Grants
Research and development grants do not confer subsidies
when provided for a broad range of disciplines and projects.
joint motion to vacate filed by the parties to that action. Nevertheless, the validity of
the subsidy analysis contained therein remains undiminished, and Michelin has been
cited not only in British Steel, but also in other CIT decisions involving countervailing
duties. See, e.g., Agrexco, Agriculture Export Co., Ltd. v. United States, slip op. 85-13
at 7 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
137. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(i) (1982).
138. 2 CIT 143 (1981), vacated, No. 75-9-02467, slip op. 85-11 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Jan. 28, 1985); see supra note 136.
139. See 2 CIT at 150-54.
140. Id. at 155.
141. Id. at 156.
142. Id. at 157.
143. Id.
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However, when aimed at a particular industry, they confer sub-
sidies. In Agrexco, Agricultural Export Co., Ltd. v. United States,' 44
the published results of research and development were made
available to all rose growers worldwide and to the general pub-
lic. The court expressed its opinion that "it is immaterial
whether the information is disseminated to all groups, but
whether the research and development is targeted to assist a
particular, rather than a general, industry .... If the research
and development is targeted to the production of roses, it is a
subsidy."' 145 Accordingly, the court remanded this program to
Commerce for a determination of its value. 1 46
iv. Exemption from Payment of Taxes
In Agrexco, the CIT concluded that Agrexco's exemption
from payment of real property taxes paid by other firms consti-
tuted a countervailable subsidy. 4 7 To similar effect is the deci-
sion in Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States,' 48 in which the court
determined that a real property tax calculated in a manner dif-
ferent from other real property taxes in the same taxing dis-
trict is a bounty when lower tax payments result. 149
As noted earlier, however, laws of taxation are not subsi-
dies to the taxpayer unless they are selectively administered re-
lieving only some business enterprises from the obligation of
payment. 50
b. Export Subsidies
The countervailing duty law defines export subsidies by
reference to Annex A to the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures which set forth an illustrative list of
export subsidies (Illustrative List).' 5 ' Pursuant to Subpara-
graph (g) of the Illustrative List, a nonexcessive rebate of indi-
rect taxes upon exportation is not a subsidy. In the absence of
144. 604 F. Supp. 1238 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
145. 604 F. Supp. at 1241-42.
146. Id. at 1242.
147. 604 F. Supp. at 1243.
148. 2 CIT 143 (1981), vacated, No. 75-9-02467 slip op. 85-11 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Jan. 28, 1985); see supra note 136.
149. 2 CIT at 157.
150. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 CIT 339, 342, 590 F. Supp.
1237, 1245 (1984).
151. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982).
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statutory guidelines regarding application of Subparagraph
(g), Commerce has developed a three-prong test to determine
whether an export payment made as a rebate of an indirect tax
is an export subsidy. The three prongs of Commerce's test
are: 1) does the export payment operate for the purpose of
rebating indirect taxes; 2) is there a clear link between eligibil-
ity for export payments and payment of indirect taxes; and 3)
has the government reasonably calculated and documented the
actual indirect tax incidence borne by the exported product
and demonstrated a clear link between such tax incidence and
the amount of the export payment? 152 The CAFC upheld this
test as a reasonable interpretation of the requirements of the
countervailing duty law in Industrial Fasteners Group, American
Importers Ass'n v. United States.153 In considering this test, the
court determined that the proper time to establish the "clear
link" between the indirect tax incidence and the rate of export
payment is the time when the export payment rate is estab-
lished, 154 and, that a determination by Commerce that a clear
link exists must be supported by substantial evidence. 
15 5
Since the information submitted to Commerce by the
plaintiff in Industrial Fasteners was insufficient for the agency to
draw any conclusions regarding the extent to which certain
Cash Compensatory Support on Export program payments
represented a rebate of indirect taxes, the court upheld Com-
merce's determination that the payments were completely
countervailable. 15
6
c. Valuation of Subsidies
Commerce's determinations have not fared as well in
cases that have called into question Commerce's measurement,
allocation and valuation of subsidies. For example, in another
case entitled Industrial Fasteners Group, American Importers Ass 'n v.
United States,' 57 the court remanded a Commerce determina-
152. See, e.g., Leather Wearing Apparel from Argentina, 46 Fed. Reg. 23,090
(1981); Certain Iron-Metal Castings from India, 45 Fed. Reg. 55,502 (1980); Certain
Fasteners from India, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,607 (1980).
153. 710 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
154. Id. at 1581.
155. Id. at 1581-83.
156. Id. at 1582.
157. 3 CIT 25 (1982), reh'g denied, 3 CIT 56 (1982).
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tion regarding quantification of the benefit conferred by cer-
tain packing credit loans and income tax deductions. In doing
so, the court observed that Congress intended that the amount
of gross subsidy be measured by the value of the subsidy to the
extent the subsidy is actually used. 158 In view of the above, the
court could not sustain Commerce's determination regarding
tax deductions, since it appeared to be based on figures for the
amount of benefits claimed rather than the amount of benefits
allowed. Similarly, it could not sustain Commerce's determina-
tion respecting packing credit loans, because it was not based
on the extent to which the loan was actually used. 5 '
Another case in which the court was called upon to review
calculation of a bounty was Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States. 160
The court upheld the administrative determination that certain
imported tires had benefited from bounties or grants from
governmental regional development programs. However, it
found error in the calculation of the bounty from a loan to the
manufacturer and in the allocation of grants over the period of
the loan.
The court rejected Treasury's calculation of the benefit of
certain loans, since it "exaggerated" the benefit of a deferral of
principal "beyond reason" by failing to limit the benefit to a
single principal amount. The court stated: "If benefits exist in
years after the year of deferral, they cannot be more than inter-
est ramifications of an original benefit in the year of deferral.
To revive the deferred amount year after year defies real-
ity.'' 161
The court also questioned Treasury's method of allocating
cash grants over the period of Michelin's original loan. Ac-
158. 3 CIT at 25-26.
159. Id. at 27-28.
160. 2 CIT 143 (1981), vacated, No. 75-9-02467, slip op. 85-11 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Jan. 28, 1985); see supra note 136. At the time of the countervailing duty proceeding
at issue in Michelin, the only countervailing duty law in force was set forth at 19
U.S.C. § 1303, and it was administered by the Secretary of the Treasury. After the
enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, all functions of the Secretary of the
Treasury in administering the countervailing duty law were transferred to the Secre-
tary of Commerce pursuant to Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 5(a)(l)(C), 44 Fed. Reg.
69,275, 93 Stat. 1381, effective January 2, 1980, except that the Customs Service was
to accept such deposits, bonds or other security deemed appropriate by the Secretary
of Commerce, and assess and collect such duties as directed by the Secretary of Com-
merce.
161. 2 CIT at 157.
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cording to the court, the grant of a new loan freed Michelin
from having to apply the grants toward repayment of the origi-
nal loan. Thus, any linkage between the grants and the loan
period terminated, as did any justification for allocating the
benefit of the grants over the period of the original loan. 6 '
In this connection, the court noted that the funds are usu-
ally allocated over the life of the assets purchased. 6 3 How-
ever, where grants on capital assets such as plant and equip-
ment are concerned, the court noted the "possibility that bene-
fits may have a disproportionately beneficial effect in the early
years."' 64 In view of the paucity of evidence establishing the
correct useful life of the capital assets in question, the court
remanded the matter to the "Secretary of Commerce to con-
sider whether any justification existed for allocating the grants
to a period shorter than the useful life of the capital assets, or
to determine the useful life of the assets if no shorter period
[of allocation] was justified." 165
In its redetermination, Commerce concluded that the
grants should be calculated over half the useful accounting life
of the capital assets they were used to purchase. It based its
determination on a variety of factors such as an "inferred con-
gressional directive ... for presumptive use of periods of less
than full useful life .... the congressional intent to front load
the benefit of grants which aid an enterprise in acquiring capi-
tal plant and equipment.... [and] the inherent nature of these
grants to bestow a disproportionate benefit in the earlier years
after receipt.' '1 66
The court flatly rejected the redetermination, noting that
the asserted legislative mandate does not exist, and that the
agency's proferred rationales were not based on generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. 67 The court determined that
Commerce must allocate the benefits experienced by the recip-
ient of a capital grant according to either uniform and gener-
162. 2 CIT at 167.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 168.
166. Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 4 CIT 252, 253 (1982), vacated, No.
75-9-02467, slip op. 85-11 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 28, 1985) (quoting ITA's Final Re-
sults of Redetermination and/or Recalculation Pursuant to Court Remand); see supra
note 136.
167. Id. at 254.
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ally accepted accounting principles or principles that are based
on an independent, direct factual finding of benefit to the com-
pany receiving the benefits.168 It further found that Com-
merce's use of half the useful life of the capital assets was un-
supported by recognized accounting principles or by a factual
determination which could justify departure from those princi-
ples. 169 Thus, it remanded the issue to the agency for further
reconsideration, and spoke approvingly of a method which
would recognize the time value of money over the life of the
assets purchased.1 70
With respect to the loan allocation, the court concluded
that application of the interest differential over the entire loan
would correctly reflect the benefit received by the plaintiff.' 7'
The court was subsequently faced with the task of review-
ing Commerce's redetermination regarding allocation of the
benefits received by Michelin by virtue of the capital grants. In
Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 17 2 the court expounded on its
suggestion regarding generally accepted accounting princi-
ples, noting that these principles "cannot be allowed to cause
significant deviations from the basic correspondence of the
subsidy to the benefit.' 7 ' The court found that ITA's method
of allocation, which was derived from the present value of an
annuity, was not in accordance with law, because it "does not
accurately express the benefit in each year in the manner in
which the genuine commercial alternatives available to a com-
pany would be expressed.' 1 74 In the court's view, the law re-
quires a "correspondence between the [countervailing] duty
and the benefit, in accordance with the most likely commercial
alternatives." 175
Regarding the interest rate factor used by the ITA in its
attempt to incorporate the time value of money into its calcula-
tion of the subsidy, the court noted that
168. Id.
169. Id. at 255.
170. Id. at 255-56.
171. Id. at 256.
172. 6 CIT 320 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), vacated, No. 75-9-02467, slip op. 85-11
(Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 28, 1985); see supra note 136.
173. Id. at 321.
174. Id. at 324-25.
175. Id. at 325.
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[t]he value of money given to a beneficiary is directly related
to the cost of those alternatives to that particular benefici-
ary. To the extent that the grant relieves the beneficiary of
the need to obtain alternative financing, it is the interest
rate associated with that alternative which is the real and
ascertainable benefit. 17
6
The court concluded that the ITA's use of an interest rate de-
rived from long-term Canadian government bonds was flawed
and not in accordance with law, as it was not based on a factual
finding of the rate which Michelin would have had to pay for
alternative financing. 17
7
In the court's view, the ITA has a duty to determine "what
would have been the cost to the beneficiary of the most likely
alternative" based on the evidence before it or based on the
interest terms that would have been applied to the alternative
financing. In order to satisfy the statute, the interest rate on
the alternative financing must be applied to the grant such that
it expresses the value of the grant over the years of its utility
and corresponds to the benefit in each year.'7 8 The court re-
jected the argument that valuation of subsidies must be limited
to their face value regardless of the period of their usefulness,
noting that this view defies commercial and financial reality.
The court noted that a method of providing for the time value
of money was "in harmony with the law and with the relevant
international agreements."'' 79
This case was tried de novo rather than "on the rec-
ord,"'' 0 and therefore the court decided without further re-
mand to the ITA. The court held that the proper method of
allocating benefits from the grant to the recipients is to allo-
176. Id. at 326.
177. Id. at 327.
178. Id. at 327. In this connection, the court noted that the rate of interest on
alternative financing (used in calculating the time value of the grant) reasonably may
be determined as of the date of the financing agreement rather than the date of re-
ceipt of the funds and may reasonably be calculated on an annual rather than shorter
basis, in accordance with the normal commercial practice for this type of transaction.
Id. at 328.
179. Id. at 328-29.
180. Id. at 327. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 added a new section, 516A,
to the Tariff Act of 1930, altering the availability and scope ofjudicial review in coun-
tervailing duty and dumping cases. One of the changes provides that judicial review
will be based on the record before the administrative agency and not be a de novo
proceeding.
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cate the principal amount of the grant "on a straight-line basis
over the life of the asset it was used to purchase [and add to
the amount, the] interest expense", which the beneficiary
would have to pay on the remaining balance of the principal in
accordance with the normal commercial financial practices."' 8 '
d. Suspension of Countervailing Duty Investigations
In United States Steel Corp. v. United States,182 the court inter-
preted section 704 of the Trade Agreements Act of 197918" to
require suspension of an investigation if at any time prior to
the end of the investigation Commerce finds that the foreign
interests have acted to end or offered to end the practice al-
leged or preliminarily found to be a subsidy.'8 4 The CIT tem-
pered this requirement by recognizing that, notwithstanding
the foregoing, the ITA has discretion to continue an investiga-
tion provided that it can articulate reasons that are sanctioned
by section 704.185
H. International Trade Commission (ITC) Injury Determinations
In the area of injury determinations by the ITC, cases have
arisen involving both preliminary' 8 6 and final' 8 7 injury deter-
minations.
1. Preliminary Injury Determinations
Within 45 days from receipt of an antidumping or coun-
tervailing' 8 8 duty petition, or from self-initiation of an investi-
181. 6 CIT at 327.
182. 5 CIT 245, 566 F. Supp. 1529 (1983), modified, 569 F. Supp. 874 (1983),
vacated, 7 CIT 48 (1984).
183. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c (1982).
184. 5 CIT at 252.
185. Id.
186. Pursuant to statute, the ITC must make a preliminary injury determination
within 45 days of filing of an antidumping or countervailing duty petition or of notice
of commencement of an investigation. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a), 1673b(a) (1982).
If the determination is affirmative, then the antidumping or countervailing duty in-
vestigation will proceed. Conversely, if the determination is negative, then the inves-
tigation will be terminated. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 167lb(a), 1673b(a) (1982).
187. § 1671d(b), 1673d(b) (1982).
188. Injury determinations apply in countervailing duty cases only when the
countervailing duty petition is filed under the new countervailing duty law (19 U.S.C.
§9 1671 et seq.) by a country under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures.
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gation by the Secretary of Commerce, the ITC must decide
whether there is a reasonable indication that an industry in the
United States is materially injured, or threatened with material
injury or whether there is a reasonable indication that an in-
dustry is materially retarded from being established in the
United States. 189 The purpose of the preliminary injury deter-
mination is "to eliminate unnecessary and costly investigations
which are an administrative burden and an impediment to
trade." 90 In keeping with this purpose, if the ITC's prelimi-
nary injury determination is affirmative, then the antidumping
or countervailing duty investigation will proceed. On the
other hand, if the preliminary injury determination is negative,
then the investigations at both the Commerce Department and
the ITC will be terminated. 19'
In interpreting the "reasonable indication" of injury stan-
dard, the CIT has tended to reject ITC determinations which
weighed evidence on injury at the preliminary stage. Thus, for
example, in Republic Steel Corp. v. United States,1 92 which involved
a review of several terminations of countervailing duty investi-
gations of imported steel products based on negative injury
findings by the ITC, Judge Watson concluded that the ITC's
determinations were not made in accordance with law, inas-
much as the agency incorrectly exceeded the "low threshold...
of whether there is a reasonable indication of injury .... "I In
the court's view, "[tihe object of these [preliminary injury] determina-
tions should have been simply to find whether there were any facts which
raised the possibility of injury. The resolution or interpretation of con-
flicting facts should have been reserved for a possible final injury determi-
nation. "194
The court in Republic Steel expressed, inter alia, the follow-
ing reasons for its holding. First, it noted that the statute's
"reasonable indication" language suggests that "only the
barest clues or signs [are] needed to justify further inquiry. "195
189. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a), 1673b(a) (1982).
190. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 7186, 7308.
191. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 167lb(a), 1673b(a) (1982).
192. 8 CIT 29, 591 F. Supp. 640 (1984), reh'g denied, No. 82-03-00372, slip op.
85-27 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
193. 8 CIT at 40, 591 F. Supp. at 649-50.
194. Id. at 40, 591 F. Supp. at 650 (emphasis in original).
195. Id. at 36, 591 F. Supp. at 646.
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The court also referred to the legislative history in its analysis,
noting that the House Report stated that a reasonable indica-
tion of injury would exist in "each case in which the facts rea-
sonably indicate that an industry in the United States could pos-
sibly be suffering material injury."' 196 Similarly, the Senate Re-
port "'97 indicated to the court that "the ITC decision is
primarily part of the decision as to whether an investigation
should be initiated" and therefore "should display the same
spirit of receptiveness to the initiation of investigations as the
ITA sufficiency [of the petition] determination."' 9 s In short,
the court took the view that the preliminary injury determina-
tion has a very limited purpose, namely, to "weed out those
cases which were clearly without merit and which could not
possibly deserve further investigation."' 199
The Republic Steel rationale has been applied in at least
three other decisions of the CIT. InJeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v.
United States,200 the court followed the standard articulated in
Republic Steel and remanded the action to the ITC for reconsid-
eration of whether there was a reasonable indication of mate-
rial injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. The
court wrote:
Here, the Commission's preliminary injury determina-
tions did not address the question of whether there is suffi-
cient information in the record to raise the possibility of in-
jury, but rather sought to definitively resolve the issues by
weighing the conflicting evidence. Put another way, the
Commission's "preliminary" determination, in effect, con-
stituted a final determination predicated solely upon data
submitted in the forty-five day period permitted at the pre-
liminary stage.' ° '
Later in American Grape Growers Alliance For Fair Trade v.
United States,2 °2 the court reiterated its view that under the stat-
196. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing H.R. REP. No. 4537, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
at 52 (1979)).
197. S. REP. No. 39, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 381, 435.
198. 8 CIT at 36, 591 F. Supp. at 647 (emphasis in original).
199. Id.
200. 607 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
201. Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
202. 615 F. Supp. 603 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal docketed sub nom. Banfi Prods.
v. United States, No. 86-556 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 11, 1985).
1986-19871
242 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:205
ute the ITC need only focus on the question of whether there
is a "possibility of injury." The court reversed the ITC's prelim-
inary negative injury determination, holding that it had used
an overly stringent standard. According to the court, the ITC
had undertaken far too complex an analysis of conflicting and
incomplete evidence in reaching its determination, thereby
placing an unduly harsh burden on the petitioner at an early
stage of the investigation. °3
Similarly, in Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States,2 °4 the CIT
reviewed an ITC determination that there was no indication of
material injury or threat thereof from imports of tires from Ko-
rea. The CIT applied the Republic Steel rationale and deter-
mined that
what the ITC has done here is to conduct a final investiga-
tion in the guise of an entirely different and more rudimen-
tary proceeding. It has looked to the reality of injury, not
the possibility of injury.... In short, it appears that the price
of obtaining an investigation is being raised to the point
where a petitioner must do much more than simply present
the possibility of injury. 20 5
This was seen as a "distortion of the law and a major interfer-
ence with the legislative purpose. ' 20 6 Accordingly, the court
reversed and remanded the ITC's determination.
The Federal Circuit recently overruled Republic Steel and
its progeny in the case of American Lamb Co. v. United States.2 "7
In that case the Federal Circuit upheld the Commission's
weighing of conflicting evidence at the preliminary injury de-
termination stage as "permissible within the statutory frame-
work."' 20 8 In rejecting the CIT's view that the statutory term
203. 615 F. Supp. at 607-08.
204. 614 F. Supp. 1252 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
205. Id. at 1253.
206. Id.
207. 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
208. Id. at 1001. In doing so, the court specifically upheld the ITC's longstand-
ing practice of using a two-pronged standard for determining whether a reasonable
indication of material injury exists. That standard requires the ITC to reach a nega-
tive determination "only when (1) the record as a whole contains clear and convinc-
ing evidence that there is no material injury or threat of such injury; and (2) no likeli-
hood exists that contrary evidence will arise in a final investigation." See, e.g., Low-
Fuming Brazing Copper Wire and Rod from France, New Zealand and South Africa, Inv. Nos.
701-TA-237 and 731-TA-247 (Preliminary), U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 1673 (1985); Un-
coated Free Sheet Offset Paper From Canada, Inv. No. AA192 1-10, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 869
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"reasonable indication" means a mere "possibility," or that it
suggests "only the barest clues or signs needed to justify fur-
ther inquiry," the Federal Circuit interpreted the statute as
calling for "a reasonable indication of injury, not a reasonable
indication of need for further inquiry. ' 20 9 It also put the lower
court's interpretation of the House Report in context, noting
that the single sentence relied on by the CIT "cannot serve to
substitute 'possibility' for 'reasonable indication' in the stat-
ute."'2 to Furthermore, observed the court, if the CIT's stan-
dard were correct, then the "weeding out" purpose of the pre-
liminary injury investigation would be thwarted, since
"[v]irtually every petitioner can be expected to submit allega-
tions and information sufficient to show some 'possibility' of in-
jury. "211
The Federal Circuit found support for the ITC's weighing
of evidence in the language and legislative history of the stat-
ute. Specifically, the court referred to the language of 19
U.S.C. § 1673b(a) requiring that the Commission make its pre-
liminary injury determination on the basis of "the best infor-
mation available to it at the time of the determination .... 22
It also noted that in so requiring, Congress intended that the
Commission conduct a thorough investigation, and that the
"ITC cannot conduct a 'thorough investigation' if it is permit-
ted to review only such evidence as might support a peti-
tion." 213
In conclusion, the court determined that:
the notion that allegations in a petition found unsupport-
able because of overwhelming contradictory evidence
should nonetheless result in a full investigation and poten-
tial imposition of provisional remedies is directly contrary
to Congress' intent . . . of eliminating 'unnecessary and
costly investigations' and the 'impediment to trade' that
would reside in an unwarranted imposition of provisional
remedies. Considering and weighing, under the ITC's
(1978); Butadiene Acrylonitrile Rubber from Japan, Inv. No. AA1921-1, U.S.I.T.C. Pub.
No. 727, at 5 (1975). In the court's view, this standard ensured that unwarranted
termination of investigations would not occur. 40 Fed. Reg. 18618, 18619 (1975).
209. 785 F.2d at 1001.
210. Id. at 1002.
211. Id. (emphasis in original).
212. Id. at 1002.
213. Id. at 1003.
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guidelines, all evidence gathered within the 45 days avail-
able for conducting a preliminary investigation, on the
other hand, effectuates that legislative intent. 21 4
Significantly, even after American Lamb, the standard to be
utilized by the ITC in making its preliminary injury determina-
tions is still considerably less strict than that which must be
applied in a final injury determination.
2. Final Injury Determinations
If the final determination by Commerce in an antidumping
or countervailing duty investigation is affirmative, then the
ITC must determine whether an industry in the United States
is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or
whether establishment of an industry in the United States is
materially retarded by imports which Commerce has deter-
mined are being subsidized and/or sold at less than fair value
in the United States.21 5
Material injury is defined by statute as "harm which is not
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant. ' 21 6 In applying
the "material injury" standard, the ITC considers three cate-
gories of injury indicators: 1) volume of imports; 2) effect of
the imports on the price of the like product; and 3) the impact
of imports on domestic producers of like products.21 7 The
weight ascribed to each factor depends on the facts of each
case; no single factor is dispositive. In fact, the law specifically
disclaims the controlling effect of the presence or absence of
any one of the evaluative factors.21 8
Thus, in SCM Corp. v. United States,21 9 the CIT determined
that market penetration of merchandise sold at less than fair
value is not, in and of itself, a sufficient basis to make an affirm-
ative finding of injury in a dumping proceeding. Although
market penetration was relevant, the court found that the ITC
had correctly discharged its obligation in making its determi-
nation by considering and weighing a number of other eco-
nomic and financial factors, including the health of the domes-
214. Id. at 1004.
215. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(l), 1673d(b)(l) (1982).
216. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982).
217. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1982).
218. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(E)(ii) (1982).
219. 4 CIT 7, 544 F. Supp. 194 (1982).
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tic industry. The weight the ITC chose to give market penetra-
tion as opposed to other equally pertinent injury criteria was
considered a "matter of discretion and expert judgment. 220
The court also upheld the ITC's finding that there was no
substantial evidence of price suppression. The ITC based its
finding on a comparison of respective wholesale price indexes
for portable and office typewriters, which showed that the
prices for both types of typewriters increased at a comparable
pace during the relevant period. In view of this trend, the
court agreed with the ITC that imports at less than fair value
(LTFV) had not resulted in price suppression. 2 1
The ITC's finding that there was no substantial evidence
that the domestic industry lost a significant number of sales as
a result of LTFV imports was also upheld. "The information
before the Commission showed that while the percentage of
the market attained by Japanese imports increased during the
period of 1971-74, the market share in that period for all imports
dropped, and consequently, SCM's own sales increased substan-
tially, both relatively to imports and in absolute terms. ' 222 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the ITC's negative injury determina-
tion.
In British Steel Corp. v. United States, 223 which involved a
challenge to the ITC's affirmative injury determination in a
countervailing duty case, the court likewise upheld specific
findings by the ITC in connection with import volume, price
undercutting and price depression.224 However, the British
Steel case is perhaps most significant for confirming that in ana-
lyzing whether imported merchandise is causing injury to the
United States industry, a direct correlation between price de-
pression and import volume is not required to determine that
the imports are "a causal factor of price depression." All that
is required by the statute is that the imports contribute to the
overall injury of the U.S. industry. They need not be a princi-
pal or even a significant cause of such injury. "The test of cau-
sation is whether the imports from a particular country are
contributing to the injury being suffered by the domestic in-
220. 4 CIT at 13, 544 F. Supp. at 199.
221. 4 CIT at 14, 544 F. Supp. at 200.
222. 4 CIT at 15, 544 F. Supp. at 201 (emphasis in original).
223. 8 CIT 86, 593 F. Supp. 405 (1984).
224. 8 CIT at 94-97, 593 F. Supp. at 411-14.
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dustry. "225
Moreover, the court found that the fact that factors other
than subsidized imports may also injure the U.S. industry is
irrelevant, because the ITC is precluded from weighing the
significance of subsidized imports as a cause of injury to a do-
mestic industry against other factors that cause injury to the
industry.226 Thus, while the ITC can properly weigh market
penetration and other factors in reaching its injury determina-
tion, as it was permitted to do in SCM Corp., under British Steel,
the ITC may not engage in a weighing process in determining
whether injury to an industry is "by reason of" subsidized or
dumped imports.
Maine Potato Council v. United States, 227 involved a challenge
to the ITC's negative injury determination on several grounds.
First, the ITC had not considered the size of the dumping mar-
gins or their impact on the domestic industry in reaching a de-
cision. Second, it had used an erroneous standard in deter-
mining whether imports were a contributing cause of injury.
Third, it had not examined proper price levels in deciding that
there was no underselling. Finally, the ITC did not properly
consider quality differences when evaluating lost sales data,
price suppression and underselling. The court agreed with the
ITC that the statute does not require the agency to consider the
amount of dumping margins, but remanded the case for clarifi-
cation on the other issues raised.228
Following the remand, the court upheld the ITC's clarified
conclusions and its negative injury determination. 229 Regard-
ing the question of differences in quality of the merchandise,
the court noted that although quantification of such differences
is ordinarily required, it was not necessary in this case, because
the ITC found such differences to be marginal, and the evi-
dence showed wide fluctuations in margins of overselling and
differences of opinion as to what external quality factors actu-
ally existed.23 °
The court also upheld the ITC's clarified conclusion that
225. 8 CIT at 97, 593 F. Supp. at 413.
226. Id.
227. 617 F. Supp. 1088 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
228. Id. at 1090.
229. See id., at 1091-92.
230. Id. at 1090.
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the volume of imports of Chnadian potatoes were not a con-
tributing cause of injury. 231 As to the ITC's conclusions on
price effects, the court found that on the basis of the evidence
before it, the ITC could rationally find that "farm losses and
price declines did not correlate with increases in import vol-
ume and market penetration. ' 2 2 Additionally, the court de-
termined that the ITC could appropriately consider price
movements instead of absolute prices in concluding that price
effects outside the region where imports competed were paral-
lel to price effects within the region.233
In a more recent decision, Gifford-Hill Cement Co. v. United
States,2 34 the court reviewed an ITC negative injury determina-
tion in an antidumping case involving Portland Hydraulic Ce-
ment from Australia andJapan. At issue was the ITC's conclu-
sion that the United States industry, although "experiencing
difficulties," was not injured " 'by reason of' the imported ce-
ment. 2
3 5
The plaintiffs alleged various errors in the ITC's analysis
of the causation issue. They claimed that the ITC disregarded
certain indicators of impact on the domestic industry, that the
ITC erred in assessing the impact of imports on domestic
prices and that it failed to consider the cumulative effect of the
Japanese and Australian imports, along with certain subsidized
Mexican cement.2 36
The court upheld the ITC's determination, finding it to
have been based on substantial evidence. As to the ITC's ana-
lytical framework, the court stated that the ITC's use of a sub-
market analysis in a regional industry case was valid. The
court also upheld the ITC's correlation of distance and volume
of sales in evaluating the effects of imports on submarkets.2 3 7
The ITC's approach to lost sales and its conclusion that
the volume of imports and sales lost to imports was insignifi-
cant in the context of the injury in this particular case were
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1091.
233. Id.
234. 615 F. Supp. 577 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
235. See id. at 579.
236. Id. at 582-84.
237. See id. at 582.
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likewise upheld.2 38 In this regard, the court noted that the
statutory scheme does not require the ITC to focus on lost
sales per se or to analyze the impact of LTFV imports on do-
mestic producers based on a specific type of lost sales analy-
sis. 239
The court found that absent a showing to the contrary, the
ITC was presumed to have considered factors such as profits,
market share, productivity, and utilization of capacity as indicia
of causation. Thus, the court found that the ITC need not is-
sue findings and conclusions on every statutory element per-
taining to injury merely because it was raised by a petitioner.24 °
The court also upheld the ITC's analysis regarding effects
of imports on domestic prices. Specifically, it concluded that
the ITC's finding that price declines occurred in areas of no
import competition was based on a valid sub-market analy-
sis.24 1 The court stated that plaintiffs' citation to evidence of
record was supportive of the ITC's conclusions, and the plain-
tiffs could not produce an alternative theory which was suffi-
cient to overturn the ITC's finding.242
Finally, the court upheld the ITC's decision not to con-
sider cumulative imports from Japan, Australia and Mexico,
noting that the imports in this case entered the region in differ-
ent areas and affected only limited areas of the region. Fur-
thermore, each area was found to be affected by only one
source of imports.243 These factors, coupled with the ITC's
conclusions regarding price effects and lost sales, provided no
basis for remanding the case to the ITC for cumulation.244 No-
238. Id.
239. Id. at 585-86.
240. Id. at 587.
241. See id. at 587-88.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 589-90.
244. By contrast, in American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair Trade v. United
States, No. 84-04-00575, slip op. 85-84 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 8, 1985), the CIT re-
versed a preliminary negative injury determination, holding that it was erroneous for
the ITC to fail to consider imports of table wine from France and Italy in a cumulated
manner. The ITC decided not to consider the imports cumulatively based on its view
that the imports "did not exhibit a collective 'hammering' effect on domestic wine
prices." Id. at 5. This conclusion was predicated on a finding that the French and
Italian wines were of different types (white versus effervescent) and that they were
usually marketed by separate groups of importers.
The court found that these conclusions were based on "a depth of analysis and
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tably, however, the court specifically limited its finding as to
cumulation, leaving open the issue of whether cumulation
would be appropriate in another context, absent competition
among imports.24 5
3. Threat of Material Injury
The factors considered in determining whether there is a
threat of material injury to United States industry are slightly
different from those considered in determining whether there
is existing material injury. The cases teach that in order for an
ITC finding of threat of material injury to be sustained, the evi-
dence must show that there is a real and imminent likelihood
of injury. In fact, the CIT has reversed an injury finding based
on evidence which showed only a mere possibility that injury
might occur at some future time. In Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v.
United States,2 46 the CIT stated that the determination of the 3-
2 majority of the ITC was "flawed with supposition and conjec-
ture. ' 247 The court chided the ITC for finding threat on the
basis of the possibility of the construction of a new production
facility. And, even if the production facility were built, the in-
jury would not occur until at least three years in the future. 248
specificity of information which is unreasonable to expect, and unlawful to demand,
in the preliminary phase of the investigation," and further noted that the ITC erred
in making the standard of competition needed to justify cumulation more stringent
than that utilized for meeting the definition of "like product." Id. at 5-6. In the
court's view cumulation cannot properly be conditioned on anything more than "the
possibility that imports from a given source will participate in a combined injurious
effect on domestic industry." Id. at 11. See also Republic Steel Corp. v. United States,
591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), reh'g denied, No. 82-03-00372, slip op. 85-27
(Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 11, 1985).
245. 615 F. Supp. at 590, n.18. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984) recently amended 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) to require the ITC
to "cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports from two or more countries
of like products subject to investigation if such imports compete with each other and
with other products of the domestic industry in the United States market." This
amendment mandates that the ITC add together imports from two or more countries
under simultaneous investigation to assess the overall injury to the domestic indus-
try. The change in the law unquestionably limits the ITC's discretion under the old
law to decide whether cumulation is appropriate in a given case, and, as a practical
matter, the amendment may inure to the detriment of both foreign respondents and
importers.
246. 1 CIT 312, 515 F. Supp. 780 (1981).
247. 1 CIT at 324, 515 F. Supp. at 791.
248. Id.
249
250 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:205
In a more recent case, Rhone Poulenc, S.A. v. United States,249
the CIT determined that in making its final determination as to
threat, the ITC must examine "demonstrable trends," such as
market penetration, in conjunction with the threat of the spe-
cific indicia of present material injury set forth in the statute250
and in the regulations.2 5' In the court's view, these concrete
factors required to be considered in a final determination of
present injury must be reviewed in the threat of injury context
to determine the imminence of actual injury. These factors in-
clude the volume of imports of the merchandise which is the
subject of the investigation, the effect of imports of that mer-
chandise on prices in the United States for like products, and
the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic produ-
cers of like products. 52
Section 612 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984253 incor-
porates specific criteria to be considered by the ITC. The
amended law codifies the standards set forth in the cases, and
the ITC now must find that the threat of material injury is real
and that actual injury is imminent, and such a finding "may not
be made on the basis of mere conjecture or supposition. 254
I. Administrative Reviews and Revocation
Over the past few years, the courts have also had occasion
to consider cases involving periodic administrative reviews and
revocation. In Smith-Corona Group, Consumer Products Division,
SCM Corp. v. United States,255 the CIT ruled that although an
annual Section 751 review must take place every 12 months
following the date of an antidumping order, the law does not
preclude a review determination from being made at an earlier
date. Presumably, this would apply to reviews of counter-
vailing duty orders as well.
The court has also addressed an ITC administrative re-
view based on changed circumstances. Unlike the annual sec-
tion 751 review, a changed circumstances review is to be con-
249. 8 CIT 47, 592 F. Supp. 1318 (1984).
250. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B).
251. 19 C.F.R. § 207.26 (1986).
252. 8 CIT at 51, 592 F. Supp. at 1322-23.
253. Pub. L. No. 98-573 (1984) (hereinafter the 1984 Act).
254. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
255. 1 CIT 89, 507 F. Supp. 1015 (1980), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
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ducted only if it is shown that changed circumstances sufficient
to warrant review exist.256 Furthermore, the regulations pro-
vide that absent a showing of "good cause," this type of review
is not to take place within 24 months after the date of an af-
firmative final determination or a determination to suspend an
investigation.
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States,257 the
CAFC noted that the decision to undertake a changed circum-
stances review does not create an inference that an outstand-
ing antidumping order is no longer necessary. It is merely a
threshold decision that sets the review process in motion and
has no bearing on the merits of whether revocation of the an-
tidumping order is warranted. 25 8 Thus, it need not be con-
ducted in the same manner as an original investigation.259 The
court also recognized that in conducting such a review, the
ITC can draw inferences from available evidence as to the
likely effect of revocation on the behavior of importers, and in
the absence of direct evidence as to the importers' intent or
future plans regarding shipments to the U.S., the ITC may rely
on circumstantial evidence to infer likely intent, production ca-
pacity, domestic and foreign demand, and incentives to in-
crease imports.26 °
An interesting case that involved the issue of revocation of
an antidumping order is Freeport Minerals Co. v. United States.2 61
In Freeport, the CIT found that Commerce had reasonably exer-
cised its discretion in deciding to revoke an antidumping order
based on findings of no sales at less than fair value during a
period four years prior to the tentative revocation determina-
tion. The CIT therefore upheld the ITA's revocation determi-
nation.262
256. The regulations governing changed circumstances are set forth at 19
C.F.R. §§ 207.45 (ITC regulation regarding investigation to review outstanding de-
terminations), 353.53 and 355.41 (ITA regulations on administrative review of an-
tidumping and countervailing duty determination).
257. 750 F.2d 927 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
258. Id. at 932.
259. Indeed, pursuant to regulation, the agency must be convinced that modifi-
cation or revocation of an existing order will not materially injure a U.S. industry. See
id. at 932 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 207.45(a)).
260. See 750 F.2d at 933-34.
261. 7 CIT 352,590 F. Supp. 1246 (1984), rev'd, 776 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
262. See 7 CIT at 357-58, 590 F. Supp. at 1252.
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The CAFC disagreed on the basis of its findings that the
pertinent law, regulations and legislative history indicated a
legislative intent that modification or revocation of a dumping
finding be based on current data.263 The CAFC further found
that Commerce's failure to conduct an administrative review
within a year of its tentative revocation determination and to
require the two respondents covered by the tentative revoca-
tion to provide updated sales data placed upon the plaintiff an
"impermissible burden of proof contrary to the policies under-
lying the applicable statute and regulations. 2 64 In conclusion,
the CAFC held that Commerce's failure to obtain more recent
data constituted an abuse of discretion. Thus, it reversed the
CIT's decision and remanded the case to Commerce for fur-
ther proceedings. 65
II. OTHER IMPORT RELIEF LA WS
A number of decisions involving other import relief laws
have also emerged in recent years, most notably in areas in-
volving challenges to Presidential action, and cases brought
under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.266
A. Challenges to Presidential Action
In the past few years, disgruntled importers have chal-
lenged Presidential actions taken under various trade statutes.
The courts generally have sustained the Executive action
taken. In Florsheim Shoe Co., Division of Interco., Inc. v. United
States, 267 the CAFC upheld the validity of various Executive Or-
ders issued by the President pursuant to section 504 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2464, excluding certain leather
imports from India from preferential treatment under the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences (GSP).26 " The court inter-
preted section 504(a) as "an explicit grant to the President of
plenary authority" to withdraw, suspend or limit preferences at
any time upon consideration of the factors set forth in the stat-
263. 776 F.2d at 1033-34.
264. Id. at 1033.
265. Id. at 1034.
266. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
267. 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
268. 19 U.S.C. § 2461-2466 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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ute. The CAFC found that neither of the provisions alleged by
plaintiff269 to have been violated enlarge or constrict Presiden-
tial discretion under section 504(a). The court stressed that
the GSP gave broad discretionary authority to the President in
a field closely tied to foreign affairs, and that the President's
power should therefore be given an expansive rather than nar-
row construction.270 In the area of international trade "con-
gressional authorizations of presidential power should be
given a broad construction and not 'hemmed in' or 'cabined,
cribbed, confined' by anxious judicial blinders." '27 1
The court declined to view this broad grant of authority as
an unconstitutional delegation of Congress' commerce power,
noting that the statute sets forth guidelines which the Presi-
dent must observe in exercising his discretion.272 The court
then fell back on long-standing precedents establishing that in
the area of international trade, executive decisions "are re-
viewable only to determine whether the President's action falls
within his delegated authority; the statutory language has been
properly construed; and the President has complied with rele-
vant procedural requirements. ' 273 The court added that the
President's motives, reasoning, factual findings andjudgment,
are not subject to judicial review.274 Therefore, the court
would not go behind the Executive Orders to search for the
actual basis for the President's action.2 75
269. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1)(B), (d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
270. 744 F.2d at 793-96.
271. Id. at 793 (quoting South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United
States, 334 F.2d 622, 632 (Ct. Cl. 1964)).
272. For example, he may not withdraw, suspend or limit preferential treatment
except upon consideration of the factors set forth in Sections 501 or 502(c). In addi-
tion, although he may withdraw preferential treatment entirely he may not adjust
rates of duty. Furthermore, under Section 505, [19 U.S.C. § 2465] he must report to
Congress regarding operation of the GSP.
273. See, e.g., United States Cane Sugar Refiners Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399,
404 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. United States, 468 F.2d 202, 206
(C.C.P.A. 1972); see also United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 379-80
(1940).
274. Section 504(c)(1)(B) requires the President, if he determines that a certain
specified standard has been met, to withdraw duty-free status, unless he nevertheless
finds certain other listed facts or qualifications to exist. Subsection (d) of Section 504
provides, in part, that subsection (c)(l)(B) does not apply with respect to any eligible
article if a like or directly competitive article is not produced on January 3, 1975, in
the United States.
275. 744 F.2d at 795-97.
2531986-1987]
254 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:205
The CIT followed Florsheim in Sunburst Farms, Inc. v. United
276States, a recent decision involving a challenge to the Presi-
dent's removal of cut flowers from Colombia from a list of
products eligible for duty free treatment under the GSP. The
court concluded that the President's action was authorized be-
cause the Executive Order expressly referred to Title V of the
Trade Act of 1974 as authority for the President's exclusionary
action and that such action was squarely within the President's
discretionary authority under section 504(a) of that Act. Thus,
the court did not even reach the question raised by the plaintiff
regarding the proper methodology for action under the "com-
petitive need" limitation.
By contrast, in Luggage & Leather Goods Manufacturers of
America, Inc. v. United States,2 " the court determined that the
President's designation of certain man-made fiber flat goods as
articles eligible for preferential treatment under the GSP was
contrary to law. 278 Luggage and Leather Goods involved interpre-
tation of 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(1), which provides that the Presi-
dent "may not" designate certain categories of "import sensi-
tive articles" as eligible for duty free treatment under the GSP.
First among the illustrative list of such articles are "textile and
apparel articles subject to textile agreements. 279
Since the man-made fiber flat goods in question were sub-
ject to the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA),28" and the MFA was
a "textile agreement" within the plain meaning of that term as
used in section 2463(c)(1)(A), the court determined that the
President had acted contrary to law in designating the flat
goods as GSP eligible articles. 281 In reaching this conclusion,
the court rejected the government's argument that the term
"textile agreements" did not include the MFA, but only bilat-
eral agreements that impose restraints on particular products.
The court also rejected the government's argument that sec-
tion 2463 confers upon the President broad discretion regard-
276. 620 F. Supp. 735 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
277. 588 F. Supp. 1413 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
278. The articles designated GSP-eligible were then classifiable under Item
706.39 Tariff Schedules of the United States.
279. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(1)(A) (1982).
280. Entered into pursuant to Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, as
amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1854, to establish standards for regulating imports.
281. 588 F. Supp. at 1423-24.
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ing designation of GSP eligible articles. 8 2 On the contrary,
the court noted, section 2463(c) demonstrates a legislative in-
tent to restrict the exercise of Presidential discretion in the
case of import sensitive articles. 8 3
In the case of Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States,2 84 the
court sustained an ITC determination and ensuing Presidential
Proclamation arising out of an escape clause proceeding under
section 201 of the 1974 Act involving mushrooms. In review-
ing whether the scope of the Presidential Proclamation should
be restricted to include only certain mushrooms classifiable
within the pertinent tariff provision, the court observed that in
the escape clause provisions, Congress had delegated its legis-
lative authority in a tariff matter to the President and the ITC.
Thus, the ITC's and the President's actions as they pertain to
the granting or withholding of import relief are essentially leg-
islative acts and, as such, are subject to judicial review only to
determine whether: (1) proper statutory procedures were fol-
lowed; (2) the statutory language was properly construed; and
(3) the action taken was within the scope of delegated author-
ity. Using this 3-pronged inquiry, the court concluded that
these criteria had been satisfied.28 5
In a far more controversial action, Mast Industries, Inc. v.
Regan,2 s6 plaintiffs challenged the promulgation of certain in-
terim regulations by the Customs Service at the President's di-
rection. These regulations, among other things, provided
rules for the determination of country of origin for textile
products subject to quota restraints; changed regulations gov-
erning manipulation of textile products in bonded warehouses
and foreign trade zones; and gave Customs discretion to re-
quire more detailed information before allowing textile prod-
ucts to be transported in bond.28 7 In issuing the regulations,
Customs relied on section 204 of the Agricultural Act of
1956,2ss which permits the President to make agreements with
282. Id. at 1424-25.
283. Id. at 1426.
284. 596 F. Supp. 1076 (1984), aft'd, 762 F.2d 86 (Fed. Civ. 1985).
285. See 566 F. Supp. 1077, 1082.
286. 8 CIT 214, 596 F. Supp. 1567 (1984).
287. Id. at 1571-1572.
288. Agricultural Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 540, § 204, 70 Stat. 188, 200 (1956)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982 & Supp. I 1985)).
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foreign governments to limit their textile exports to the United
States.289 Notwithstanding a number of challenges to the va-
lidity of both the President's and the Customs Service's ac-
tions, the CIT upheld the regulations and the underlying au-
thority upon which they were issued, giving an extremely
broad construction to Presidential authority over matters of
foreign commerce. 290
The court determined that the congressional delegation of
power to the President in 'section 204 was valid and should be
expansively construed. According to the court, the objective
of Section 204 is to limit imports of textiles and agricultural
products into the United States. To further this objective, sec-
tion 204 authorizes the President to negotiate with other gov-
ernments whenever he considers such action appropriate and
to issue regulations to carry out such agreements. 291
The court also found that the President properly con-
strued his authority under section 204, that he had acted
within the scope of authority constitutionally delegated by
Congress, and that all relevant procedures were complied with.
The CIT found nothing in prior decisions which would pre-
vent the President from implementing his authority under sec-
tion 204 by having Customs issue regulations. The court thus
concluded that although Customs had failed to comply with
the notice and comment procedures set forth in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA),292 the regulations fell within the
"general statements of policy" and "foreign affairs" excep-
tions to the statute and, therefore, were exempt from its prior
notice and comment provisions.293 Accordingly, it denied the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and upheld the va-
lidity of the regulations and the authority under which they
were issued.294
To similar effect was the CAFC's decision in American Asso-
ciation of Exporters & Importers - Textile & Apparel Group v. United
States.295 This case involved a challenge to the Committee for
289. 596 F. Supp. at 1570.
290. 8 CIT at 223, 596 F. Supp. at 1576.
291. Id. at 222, 223, 596 F. Supp. at 1574, 1576.
292. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 - 706 (1982).
293. See 8 CIT at 226, 228-33, 596 F. Supp. at 1575, 1577-82.
294. Id. at 233, 596 F. Supp. at 1583.
295. 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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Implementation of Textile Agreements' (CITA) actions which
were alleged to have been taken pursuant to certain interna-
tional agreements regulating trade in textile products.2 96 Spe-
cifically challenged were CITA's requests for consultations and
unilateral institution of quotas without a proper finding of
"market disruption" as required by Multifiber Arrangement
and the bilaterals. It was claimed that these acts were arbitrary
and capricious, in excess of CITA's scope of delegated statu-
tory authority under section 204 of the Agricultural Act of
1956, and that they violated the rulemaking provisions of the
APA.297
The CAFC disagreed, however, and, similar to the CIT de-
cision in the Mast Industries case, it construed the statutory lan-
guage broadly and upheld CITA's actions. ,Specifically, the
court noted that section 204 "imposes no restrictions on the
President's administration of the textile trade program.. 298
The only requirement is that regulations issued to carry out
international agreements "pertain to the general subject of the
agreement." 299 Furthermore, like the CIT decision in the Mast
Industries case, the court concluded that CITA's actions did not
violate the rulemaking provisions of the APA because an inten-
tion to trigger a bilateral agreement's consultation provisions
or to impose stricter import restrictions is within the "foreign
affairs'' exception and thus exempt from the Act's notice and
comment provisions.3 0 0
B. Section 337
The section 337 cases thus far decided by the CAFC in-
volve many issues. Most notable for our purposes, however,
are those which discuss the scope of the industry protected and
injury to such an industry.
In Schaper Manufacturing Co. v. United States International
296. The primary source of the United States government's regulation of textile
trade is the Arrangement regarding International Trade in Textiles (the "Multifiber
Arrangement" or "MFA"), December 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840.
The MFA includes, inter alia, provisions for cooperation and elimination of difficulties
in the area of textile trade, and encourages parties to the agreement to enter into
bilateral textile trade agreements. See id. art. 1, § 1; art. 4, § 2.
297. 751 F.2d at 1241-42.
298. Id. at 1247.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1249.
2571986-1987]
258 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:205
Trade Commission,3 ' the CAFC upheld the ITC's termination of
a patent infringement investigation under section 337. The
court held that a domestic entity engaged in the development,
testing and marketing of certain toy vehicles and a domestic
entity engaged in the invention of toys and games which are
then licensed to toy manufacturers did not constitute a domes-
tic "industry" within the meaning of section 337. The court
noted that "the patent must be exploited by production in the
United States, and the industry in the United States generally
consists of the domestic operations of the patent owner, his
assignee and licensees devoted to exploitation of the pat-
ent."' 30 2 Although at times the term "industry" may embrace
more than the manufacture of the patented item, such as do-
mestic repair and installation activities, servicing, etc., such ac-
tivities must add "significant value" domestically to the mer-
chandise in order for them to be perceived as an "industry" in
the United States.30 3
In Bally/Midway Manufacturing Co. v. United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission304 the CAFC accepted the ITC's defini-
tion of the "domestic industry" which encompassed Bally's fa-
cilities that produced and sold only one video game.3 0 5 The
court noted the uniqueness of this narrow definition in a con-
curring opinion. "Here we have not just one company, but
one product of one company singled out as the whole 'indus-
try.' '306 The CAFC declined to comment on the potential
ramifications of such a definition, but did state that the lan-
guage defining injury as including acts "to prevent establish-
ment of an industry" is "deprived of all meaning if limited to
preventing establishment of another 'industry' to produce the
[particular] game. '"307
Neither section 332 nor the legislative history provides a
definition of injury for the purposes of the statute. Three cases
decided by the CAFC, however, provide limited guidance. In
Bally/Midway, the court noted that where the unfair practice is
301. 717 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
302. Id. at 1372.
303. Id. at 1373.
304. 714 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
305. Id. at 1121.
306. Id. at 1126.
307. Id. (emphasis added).
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the infringement of a domestic industry's copyright, trademark
or patent right, even a relatively small loss of sales may estab-
lish the requisite injury to the domestic industry.308 This, how-
ever, was later qualified in the case of Textron, Inc. v. United
States International Trade Commission,3 0 which involved an appeal
from an ITC determination that no violation of section 337 oc-
curred in the importation from Taiwan of vertical milling ma-
chines, parts, accessories and attachments. According to the
Textron decision, the holding in Bally/Midway does not require
that the ITC find injury whenever a trademark has been in-
fringed, regardless of the amount of damage caused to the do-
mestic industry. On the contrary, at the very least, "the do-
mestic industry must normally establish that the infringer
holds, or threatens to hold, a significant share of the domestic
market in the covered articles or has made a significant amount
of sales of the articles. 3 10
In Corning Glass Works v. United States International Trade
Commission,31' however, the CAFC declined to lay down a legal
standard on the quantum of injury required to constitute a vio-
lation of section 337. The court noted that the statement in
Textron regarding a showing that "the infringer holds or threat-
ens to hold, a significant share of the domestic market in the
covered articles or has made a significant amount of sales of
the articles gives guidance, but is not definitive of the consider-
ations relevant to the injury inquiry. ' 31 2 In the court's view,
the injury determination is a highly fact-specific matter within
the agency's expertise. Moreover, the court observed that
although the amount of sales of the imported and allegedly in-
fringing merchandise is "highly relevant" to the injury deter-
mination, whether the amount is "significant," as required
under Textron, cannot be based on the dollar amount of sales
alone. The court stated that comparison of the amount of in-
fringing sales with total sales of the product in question in the
United States market as well as with the volume of sales of the
domestic plaintiff and its domestic licensees was meaningful.
Thus, the ITC's conclusion, that sales of the imported mer-
308. 714 F.2d at 1124.
309. 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
310. Id. at 1029 (citation omitted).
311. 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
312. Id. at 17.
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chandise were de minimis, was rational and amply supported by
the evidence of record.31 3
CONCLUSION
The courts have varied in the extent to which they will en-
croach upon what are arguably agency prerogatives in adminis-
tering the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Thus
far, the CIT appears more willing than the CAFC to substitute
its own judgment for that of the administrative agency, particu-
larly in the area of initiation of investigations. In addition, the
Commerce Department has apparently fared better in those
cases challenging its determinations in antidumping cases than
in cases challenging its administration of the countervailing
duty law. This trend may be due, in part, to the fact that deter-
minations as to what constitute subsidies involve more subjec-
tive considerations than do applications of the antidumping
law's price comparisons which are based on financial data. It
may also be due to the fewer number of countervailing duty
cases brought before the courts.
In the area of injury determinations, the CIT has issued
decisions that reverse the ITC's determinations as well as deci-
sions which support the agency's specific findings. Further-
more, although the CIT issued a line of decisions chastising
the ITC for use of an overly stringent standard in reching its
preliminary injury determinations, the CAFC upheld the ITC's
weighing of evidence on injury at the preliminary investigative
stage. The courts have also upheld the vast majority of ITC
analyses regarding the factors to be considered in reaching a
final determination regarding material injury or threat thereof
to a domestic industry by reason of dumped or subsidized im-
ports.
In spite of these varying trends, however, it is obvious that
both the CIT and CAFC have exhibited considerable defer-
ence to the discretion conferred upon the agencies by Con-
gress, while recognizing that such discretion is not unfettered.
It also appears certain that because of the expansion of
availability of judicial review, administrative agencies have
found it necessary to become more accurate in their determi-
313. Id. at 18-19.
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nation of facts upon which they act and more open in their
consideration of legal and policy issues. Whether this open-
ness and enhanced factual accuracy will continue as the courts
develop even greater expertise in deciding cases brought
under highly complex trade statutes remains to be seen. Nev-
ertheless, the expanded availability of judicial review in trade
cases seems to have improved the substantive quality of import
relief law administration, and has helped maintain the delicate
balance between the benefits to consumers of fair competition
and protection of domestic industry from unfair competition in
the marketplace.
